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Disentangling the Repurchase Announcement 
An Event Study to the Purpose of Repurchases 
Robin Wilber 
ABSTRACT 
 
Researchers have consistently shown that a firm’s repurchase announcement is 
met with positive abnormal stock price return reactions. Open-market repurchases are 
extremely flexible, non-committal and non-punitive; thus, it is puzzling that the mere 
announcement of an open-market repurchase will likely increase a firm’s stock price. I 
propose to disentangle a firm’s choice to repurchase its stock to determine when a 
repurchase announcement is good news for shareholders and when the announcement is 
not. 
I find that the purpose of the repurchase announcement matters. At the 
announcement date, managers’ intention of avoiding dilution is significantly negative and 
enhancing shareholder value is significantly positive, as expected. However, more 
interesting results are observed at two-years and three-years post announcement where I 
show that counteracting dilution is not a good reason to conduct a repurchase and, 
although not as strongly negative, enhancing shareholder value does not bear out its 
announcement promise. Furthermore, I find that firms that repurchase their shares to 
finance an acquisition are well compensated for their efforts, especially in the long run. I 
   
 iv
attribute their success to higher cash flows resulting from reducing their tax burden with 
their amortization deduction of the goodwill created from the purchase accounting 
acquisition.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
It is well documented that when firms announce repurchase intentions, their stock 
price, on average, increases during the repurchase announcement window1 and the 
increases are persistent.2 A common explanation for this is that firms repurchase their 
stock when the managers believe that it is undervalued (Dittmar (2000)); thus, the 
repurchase activity signals undervaluation to the market. Another frequently suggested 
explanation for the positive stock price reaction to a firm’s repurchase announcement is 
that a repurchase is a good use of the firm’s free cash flows (Jensen (1986)). It is also 
suggested that repurchases may also provide for a better distribution of cash than 
dividends because of their temporary and flexible commitment (Jagannathan, Stephens 
and Weisbach (2000)).3 This is likely one reason why companies choose to distribute 
cash to shareholders as repurchases over dividend increases.4  
                                                 
1 Dann, 1981; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995.  
2 Conrad and Kaul, 1993, and Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990. 
3 See also Guay and Harford, forthcoming JFE. Lie, 2000, finds positive stock price reactions related to 
self-tender offers and also large special dividends and not for regular dividend increases. 
4 Liang and Sharpe, 1999, report that in 1997 and 1998, share repurchases by S&P 500 companies 
exceeded dividend payments to common stockholders. Also, non-bank S&P 500 firms tripled their 
repurchases from 1994 to 1998 reaching $150 billion. Over the same period dividends rose only 35% to 
$115 billion. In another study, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 2000, report that between 1996 and 
1998, more than 4,000 open-market repurchases were announced, which if fully completed, would amount 
to approximately $550 billion. During this same period cash dividends totaled $490 billion. Weston and 
Siu, 2002, show repurchases as a percentage of dividends growing from 31.4 percent to 68.1 percent from 
1994 to 1998. Despite different data sets, the empirical evidence establishes a higher growth in repurchases 
than dividends over the 1990s. 
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The increased use of open-market repurchases has coincided with an increasing 
reliance on stock options to compensate top managers. Stock options encourage managers 
to choose repurchases over conventional dividend payments because repurchases, unlike 
dividends, do not reduce the stock price (Jolls (1998)). In a 1994-1998 sample of S&P 
500 firms, gross repurchases reduced shares outstanding two percent annually; but, owing 
to the exercise of employee stock options, only about half of those shares were actually 
retired (Liang and Sharpe (1999)). Thus, it appears that repurchases are not only 
announced to signal undervaluation and as an appropriate use of free cash flow, but may 
also be conducted to cover options previously committed by the firm. Kahle (2002) 
suggests that if firms are repurchasing shares to fund employee stock options, then in an 
efficient market the announcement period return should not be as positive as if the 
repurchase were due to undervaluation or free cash flow. Signaling undervaluation or an 
effective use of cash flow are well-documented viable hypotheses that support the 
positive stock price reactions observed with the repurchase announcement.  
Since it is well known that on average stock prices increase after a repurchase 
announcement, it is possible that firm managers announce repurchases for opportunistic 
reasons. A firm manager’s options would increase in value if the stock price increased at 
the mere mention of a repurchase. Furthermore, an increase in stock price would support 
more favorable terms for an acquiring firm in a stock-financed acquisition.  
I propose that not all repurchase announcements carry the same message. With 
this in mind, I propose to contribute to this increasingly important payout choice by 
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disentangling the repurchase announcement and distinguishing between a “good news” 
repurchase and a “no good news” repurchase.5  
In chapter 2, I use standard event-study analysis to investigate the stock price 
return reaction to firms announcing a repurchase for possibly opportunistic reasons such 
as to facilitate an acquisition, to counteract dilution effects and to cover options. 
Consistent with others, I find persistence in positive abnormal returns; however, the 
possibly opportunistic reasons are less positive. Furthermore, the repurchase purpose of 
counteracting dilution shows significant negative results at two-years and three-years post 
announcement and although not as strong, enhancing shareholder value does not bear out 
its announcement promise. The strongest positive reason to conduct a repurchase is to 
initiate or to fund an employee stock option plan.  
Since it is very likely that opportunistic behavior is motivated by the level of 
executive ownership in the firm, I investigate the return reaction while controlling for 
current ownership levels and also controlling for option ownership level of the firm’s 
chief executive. Consistent with agency theory, I find the best abnormal three-years post 
announcement return performance is with firms in which CEOs own one to five percent 
of the stock and are compensated with a medium level of options. Unexpectedly, I find 
the best two-year return performance is with firms in which the CEOs own no stock and 
receive no options. This group also has the distinction of being the second best performer 
                                                 
5 Harford, 1997, recognizes that repurchases afford managers with the opportunity to behave 
opportunistically. In his investigation of Dutch-auction and fixed-price tender offer he argues that managers 
who are also shareholders can choose to participate or not in tendering their shares. If they choose to hold 
they are essentially putting their wealth at risk (especially if the signal is false). Thus, Harford argues 
managers could choose to participate in overpriced offers and not participate in underpriced offers. Using 
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at three years post announcement. This suggests that option granting and CEO ownership 
do not influence performance, or that the cost of the options outweigh the benefit of 
improved CEO performance.  
In chapter 3, I focus on firms that choose to conduct a repurchase of their own 
stock in order to facilitate an acquisition. This activity seems puzzling in that if a firm has 
the cash available to repurchase its stock and thus could use cash directly for an 
acquisition. Thus, it seems odd that a firm should take an extra transactional step to 
acquire another firm, which might result in a loss of time and corporate value.6 Also 
puzzling is the research that shows that cash-financed acquisitions perform better than 
stock-financed acquisitions. At first glance it would appear that firms are taking on 
additional transactions and on average might perform poorer. I find that this is not the 
situation. Firms that take on the extra financing step are well compensated for their 
efforts, especially in the long run. These firms have cash available and positive earnings, 
but on average have negative abnormal returns prior to their repurchase announcements. 
Thus, these firms are likely to be undervalued and therefore choose this method of 
financing to signal undervaluation in the market place. Furthermore, the stock acquisition 
step allows these firms to share risk with the target firms, counteract the negative effects 
of dilution by repurchasing their shares first, and enjoy a tax advantage for their efforts. 
Most research to date has exclusively focused on the open-market repurchase. The 
Securities Data Corporation (1994 – date) now tracks Dutch-auction (2% of all 
                                                                                                                                                 
probit analysis Harford finds that managers do not behave opportunistically, but rather set terms that offer 
to maximize shareholder wealth. 
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repurchases announced in 2000), fixed-price tender-offers (3percent), negotiated 
(4percent), and open-market negotiated (58percent), in addition to often-studied open-
market repurchases (33percent). I will include open-market repurchases, Dutch-auction 
and fixed-price tender offers in this study and control for the announcement by the level 
of option granting and the motivation of the repurchase as indicated by management. 
Furthermore, most research has not had the advantage of the last few years of data. 
Original research on repurchases and options was carried out through a long-period of a 
bull market. Due to the market downturns of the past four years, I have the advantage of 
studying repurchase and options during both an increasing return market and a decreasing 
return market.  
In order to accomplish this, I use the Securities Data Corporation Platinum 
database to determine that my sample of firms to be those that have chosen to repurchase 
their shares by the board’s announcement date(s), the type of repurchase conducted, and 
the firm’s stated reason for conducting. Information on executive compensation and 
option variables are taken from S&P ExecuComp database. Finally, the stock price return 
data is obtained from CRSP and many of my control variables from Compustat. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Most research has shown that stock-financed acquisitions decrease the market value of the bidding firm. 
See Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; Lang, Stulz, and Walkling; 1989; Servaes, 1991; and Dennis and 
McConnell, 1986. 
   
 6
 
 
Chapter 2 
When is a repurchase announcement not good news? 
 
In recent years, firms have disbursed more cash to shareholders in the form of 
repurchases than in the form of dividends,7 thus the rationale for repurchasing acquires 
added importance. In this chapter, I investigate the reported purpose of such repurchases 
to see if the repurchases carry the positive stock price reactions documented by others 
and I find that the underlying purpose matters. Since 1995, firms reported the following 
purposes for their repurchase: to enhance shareholder value; to counteract dilution; to 
fund a stock option plan; to indicate undervaluation; to fund an acquisition; to support an 
employee benefit plan; and for general business purposes. As examples of purposes 
mattering, I find that at the announcement date, managers’ intention of avoiding dilution 
carries significantly negative returns and I also find that enhancing shareholder value is 
significantly positive. Moreover, when the results are observed at two-years and three-
years post announcement they are even more interesting. For example, counteracting 
dilution is negative and thus is not a good reason to conduct a repurchase and although 
not as negative, enhancing shareholder value does not bear out its announcement promise 
at the two-year and three-year periods.  
                                                 
7 Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 2000; Liang and Sharpe, 1999. 
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The organization of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first part discusses the 
choice between repurchases and dividends, theoretical underpinnings of free cash flows 
and undervaluation and the research results, the repurchase choice and the influence of 
management options. The second section develops the hypotheses and methodology. The 
third section reports the empirical findings and the last section summarizes and concludes 
the chapter. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Repurchase or Dividend Decision 
 
During the 1990s, firms chose to disburse more cash to stockholders in the form 
of repurchases than in the traditional form of dividend payments. In 1997 and 1998, in 
fact, share repurchases by S&P 500 companies exceeded dividend payments to common 
stockholders. In fact, non-bank S&P 500 firms tripled their repurchases from 1994 to 
1998 to $150 billion. Over the same period dividends rose only 35 percent to $115 billion 
(Liang and Sharpe (1999)). Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggest that repurchases are an 
equivalent substitute for dividends. They show that the market reaction to dividend cuts is 
not significantly different from zero for firms that also repurchase their shares. Grullon 
and Michaely argue that repurchase programs should be superior to dividend payouts 
because repurchases disburse cash in a way that reduces shareholder tax liability.  
Repurchases also offer the firm flexibility in making payments and as such there 
is no long-term commitment associated with the methods of disbursement. A dividend 
increase suggests a permanent plan for disbursement. Jagannathan, Stephens and 
Weisbach (2000) suggest that dividends are paid by firms with higher permanent 
   
 8
operating cash flows and repurchases are paid by firms with higher temporary non-
operating cash flows.  
 
Free Cash Flows or Undervaluation 
Many researchers have documented abnormal positive stock price returns to firms 
that repurchase their shares.8 These researchers have found that positive cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) occur in both short-term and long-term studies. The short-term 
reaction could result from the firms conveying revaluation information to the public. 
Chang (1993) suggests that repurchases are a credible informational signal if managers 
know more than investors and information is costly. The new information could indicate 
that the firm has free cash flows and purchasing its own shares is a good investment, or 
that the firm believes that its shares are undervalued and purchasing shares is a rational 
investment in a positive net present value project.  
Researchers have put forth arguments suggesting both that repurchases signal 
undervaluation and also that repurchases are an appealing use of free cash flows.9 For 
example, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) justified announcement date 
abnormal returns of 3.5 percent for open-market repurchase announcements to managers’ 
                                                 
8 Dann, 1981; Dann, Masulis, and Mayers, 1991; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990, and Vermaelen 1981.Erwin and Miller, 1998, show that in addition to 
positive stock price reactions for firms announcing repurchases, they also find negative stock price 
reactions to rival firms.  
9 Bagwell, 1991, presents another explanation by showing that an upward sloping demand curve exists. 
Thus, when a firm repurchases its shares, given heterogeneous valuations, shareholders with the lowest 
valuations will sell and the remaining shareholders will have higher valuations and the stock price must 
increase. 
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claims to repurchase their stock because prevailing market prices are too low. Thus a 
repurchase is a good investment.  
The other hypothesis which explains positive stock price reactions is that a 
repurchase is an agency mitigating, and thus effective use of free cash flows. Jensen 
(1986) explains the problems of firm’s free cash flow as follows: It would be optimal if 
managers owned 100 percent of the firm. However, due to the legal structure in the 
United States we find that 50 percent of firms have very broad ownership. Jensen puts 
forth the often-cited hypothesis that given separation of management and ownership there 
will be agency costs. It is in the manager’s best interest, for example, to increase the 
value of his or her personal options by influencing the current market price of the stock. 
Obviously, this might also benefit the shareholders.  
In addition to agency mitigating, firms that choose to repurchase their own stock 
with free cash flows may be, in fact, choosing their best investment opportunity. The free 
cash flow hypothesis would support the positive abnormal stock price reactions 
empirically found at the announcement of a repurchase. Thus, repurchases are generally 
considered a good use of free cash flow because the repurchase reduces cash, which in 
turn reduces agency costs. On the other hand, Song (2002) argues that the open-market 
repurchase is not a credible commitment because repurchase distributions are not 
mandated by law and can occur at any time and by any method chosen by the manager.10 
                                                 
10Currently the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) has few regulations regarding disclosures of 
repurchase activities. In a nutshell, Securities and Exchange Commission release nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, 
IC-24599, file no. S7-31-99 states that an issuer conducting a repurchase program need not specify the 
amounts, prices, and dates that it will repurchase its securities; rather, the issuer can adopt a written plan 
when it is not aware of material nonpublic information. On, December 10, 2002 the SEC issued a proposed 
amendment to its 10b-18 rule regarding providing a “safe harbor” from liability for manipulation when a 
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Song (2002) 11 adds that United States corporate law does not mandate corporations to 
pay out a certain level of cash distributions, and in fact managers have strong incentives 
to avoid payouts. For example, managers are more risk-averse than shareholders because 
it is difficult to diversify their own human capital. Thus, risk-averse managers have 
strong incentive to hold extra money for unexpected future hard times. Song concludes 
that managers have the opportunity to further their own interests, which, in turn, may 
result in significant social costs that may offset any benefits of the repurchase.  
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) suggest that the market would only view open-
market repurchases as credible if they were firm commitments. Companies choosing to 
falsely signal must be forced to repurchase shares at prices above their true long-run 
value in order for there to be a cost to false signaling. Ikenberry and Vermaelen question 
                                                                                                                                                 
firm repurchases its common stock in the market in accordance with the rule’s manner, timing, price, and 
volume conditions. The SEC notes that an issuer may have the incentive to manipulate the price of its 
securities and one way to positively affect the price is to purchase securities in the open market. This 
amendment would require repurchase disclosures to Regulations S-K and S-B and Forms 10-Q, 10-QSB, 
10-K, 10-ksB, and 20-F indicating the total number of shares purchased for the previous quarter, the 
average price paid per share, the identity of the broker, the number of shares purchases as part of a publicly 
announced plan and the maximum number of shares that may yet be purchased. The SEC is also proposing 
footnote disclosure of the principal terms of publicly announced repurchase plans including 1) the date of 
the announcement, 2) the share or dollar amount approved, 3) the expiration date (if any), 4) each plan that 
has expired during the period, 5) each plan the issuer has determined to terminate prior to expiration, and 6) 
each plan the issuer has not purchased under during the period. In fact, as long as firms follow the SEC 
guidelines as set forth in SEC Rule 10b-18, firms will receive “safe harbor” protection from liability from 
purchasing their own stock. The 10b-18 Rule (SEC file no. S7-50-02) applies to bids for and purchases of 
an issuer’s common stock by or for an issuer. The safe harbor does not confer absolute protection from all 
liability for purchases (e.g. purchases that are part of a plan or scheme to evade federal security laws) even 
if made in technical compliance with the Rule. Rather the safe harbor provides only that certain, specific 
provisions of the securities laws will not be considered to have been violated solely by reason of the 
manner, timing, price, or volume of such repurchases, provided the repurchases are made within the 
limitations of the Rule. The four conditions of the rule are 1) issuer to use a single broker or dealer per day 
to bid or purchase its common stock; 2) issuer cannot bid for or purchase at the opening and during the last 
half hour of trading during the day; 3) highest price bid or pay for must be set by independent market 
forces; and 4) issuers may effect daily purchases up to 25 percent of the average daily volume. The Safe 
Harbor is a guideline for corporations to follow to avoid being accused of fraudulent trading practices. The 
guidelines are not mandatory.  
11 Song, 2002, develops the theoretical rationale to argue for regulation in open-market repurchasing.  
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whether the news of an open-market repurchase program should be viewed as a credible 
information signal and further suggest that the firm’s true intention is unknown. 
Nohel and Tarhan (1998) investigate the motive for repurchase and suggest that it 
is possible for different firms to repurchase for different reasons. For example, some 
firms may signal a bright future (undervaluation), while others distribute excess cash. 
Nohel and Tarhan look at operating performance changes to see if firms are undervalued 
and are choosing to signal this information. If this were the case, Nohel and Tarhan 
argue, we should find operating performance improvement relative to what was expected 
and thus management would be signaling credible information. Specifically, Nohel and 
Tarhan hypothesize that high-growth firms may use the repurchase to signal investment 
opportunity, while low-growth firms may distribute cash instead. Sorting by Tobin’s q, 
they unexpectedly find significant improvements in operating performance following the 
repurchases from the low-growth firms. Nohel and Tarhan find repurchasers outperform 
their matched-control firms by 23.3 percent for low q-firms but are significantly negative 
for high-q firms. They also find that leverage increases after the repurchase, but the 
results are driven by high-q sample of firms. They find that market-to-book values of low 
q firms remain lower than their control group, and post-repurchase performance at low q 
firms is correlated with assets sales, which supports the free cash flow hypothesis. 
In another study, Evans and Gentry (1999) not only find little improvement but 
actually find underperformance by repurchasing firms. They find that firms that do not 
repurchase their shares create more long-run growth in value than firms that incorporate a 
buyback strategy. Specifically, they find that small and mid-size non-repurchasing firms 
   
 12
outperform firms that repurchase their shares. Evans and Gentry attribute these results to 
the productive net working capital and capital projects investments made by the non-
repurchasing firms. Contrary to other researchers, their findings do not support the theory 
that share-repurchase programs are related to management signaling an increase in a 
firm's long-run performance in the market, nor that a repurchase strategy signals that 
shares are undervalued. 
 
Type of Repurchase 
D'Mello and Shroff (2000) show with an earning-based valuation model that 74 
percent of firms announcing fixed-price tender offers were undervalued. This would 
indicate that firms using a fixed-price tender offer are signaling a credible undervaluation 
message. Thus, it appears that managers can credibly convey their perceived dollar 
amount of stock undervaluation by the type of repurchase offer they choose. Traditional 
fixed-price tender offers specify a single purchase price in advance, a number of shares 
sought, and an expiration date. Dutch-auction offers also specify a number of shares 
sought but at a range of prices within which each tendering shareholder chooses his or 
her minimum acceptable selling price. Generally, because the Dutch auction allows the 
managers to obtain a relatively low (minimum) offer price, it follows that Dutch auctions 
should provide a weaker signal of market price undervaluation than an otherwise 
equivalent fixed-price tender offer; that is, Dutch auction offers with low minimum offer 
prices should not be as convincing a signal of undervaluation as a fixed-price tender 
offer. Comment and Jarrell (1991), in their study with 1984-1989 data, find average 
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excess returns of 11 percent at the announcement date with fixed-price tender offers and 
8 percent for Dutch auctions. Furthermore, they find that open-market repurchase 
announcements are met with only two percent average excess return. Comment and 
Jarrell’s results support the signaling hypothesis. Firms that send the strongest signal by 
attaching a clear premium are met with the greatest event-day stock price reaction. 
Li and McNally (1999) employ a conditional study framework to determine the 
characteristics of firms choosing to make tender offers over those making open-market 
repurchase offers. They find that tender offering firms have higher cash flows, higher 
dividend yields, poorer investment opportunities, greater volatility of returns and larger 
insider share holdings. Li and McNally note that this is consistent with large shareholders 
having the ability to mitigate agency problems of financial slack. They conclude that 
firms exhibit comparative advantage in their choice of repurchase method. 
Gay, Kale and Noe (1996) present a theoretical argument of the advantages of 
Dutch-auction repurchases over that of fixed-price tender offers. They confirm the 
intuitive argument that firms pay more than is needed to buy back the desired number of 
shares when conducting a fixed-price tender offer due to over-subscriptions. The authors 
suggest that if firms use a fixed-price offer, then there will be an excessive wealth 
transfer from remaining shareholders to exiting shareholders. This raises the question as 
to whether there are repurchase situations where the firm pays back too much for its 
stock.  
In another study, Hodrick (1999) finds that the firms that will face greater stock 
price elasticity are more likely to choose a Dutch-auction repurchase offer over a fixed-
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price tender offer. Other characteristics of the Dutch-auction choosing firms noted by 
Hodrick are that they have larger market capitalizations, smaller insider holdings, larger 
institutional holdings, lower trading volume and tend to repurchase fewer shares during 
the repurchase program. 
The most common type of repurchase is accomplished through open-market 
repurchases where a firm announcing the open-market repurchase provides no 
commitment to carry out its announced repurchase intentions. The firm can buy back as 
many, or as few, shares as desired over a period of time at varying current market prices.  
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that between 46 percent and 75 percent of 
firms complete their repurchase plans within one year and 74 percent and 82 percent of 
shares of all firms in the sample are actually acquired.12 Their study finds share 
repurchases are negatively related to prior stock-price performance and positively related 
to levels of cash flow. Stephens and Weisbach suggest that firms purchase the stock when 
it is undervalued and defer when it is overvalued and thus firms choose open-market 
repurchases over Dutch-auction or self-tender because of the flexibility in magnitude 
repurchased and the timing of the repurchase.13 In an out-of-sample test, Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) studied Canadian firms. Canadian firms are required 
to report each month the number of shares they actually repurchase. Surprisingly, 
                                                 
12 Altobelli and Wiggins, 1998, that on average firms repurchase more shares than originally authorized and 
conclude that the open-market repurchase announcement is a credible signal. They also find that firms 
actively issue shares while repurchasing so that the average decrease in shares outstanding is only about 
20% of the number repurchased. 
13 Cook, Krigman, and Leach, 2001, find that while there is considerable variation across firms, NYSE 
firms under-going open-market repurchase activities on average beat their benchmark whereas Nasdaq 
firms do not. This suggests that NYSE firms are able to plan the timing of their open-market transactions to 
their advantage.  
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Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen find that about 25 percent of firms never purchase 
any of their shares and less than 5 percent of firms fully complete their repurchase 
programs (overall the mean completion rate is 28.6 percent).  
If firms use repurchases to signal undervaluation then why do we not see more 
firms using fixed-price and Dutch-auction arrangements, since these two methods should 
provide a stronger signal of undervaluation? Furthermore, Song (2002) suggests that 
open-market repurchases are not credible commitments since the offers can be canceled 
anytime without legal or market punishment. Thus, there is no cost to the insiders and if 
there are no costs, such announcements cannot be viewed as a signal. However, in spite 
of the weak and questionable signal, we find the predominant structure of a repurchase 
accomplished through open-market repurchases (see Table 1). Firms choose to conduct 
an open-market repurchase six times as frequently as fixed-price self-tender and Dutch-
auctions combined. Comment and Jarrell (1991) predict that fixed-price self-tender offers 
should be the strongest signal of firm undervaluation followed by Dutch-auction. The 
weakest signal should come from open-market repurchases because they have no 
attached premium. 
It is possible that each type of repurchase implies a different message. Persons 
(1994) presents a repurchase choice model. He finds that Dutch-auction repurchases are 
more effective takeover deterrents, while fixed-price repurchases are more effective 
signals of undervaluation.  Persons’ research sheds light on why firms choose between 
Dutch-auction and fixed-price tender offers, but does not help to explain why the open-
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market procedure has become the preferred method of cash disbursement to 
shareholders.14 
 
Management Compensation and Options 
In addition to reducing free cash flows through repurchases, increasing debt 
obligations, or increasing firm’s leverage or risk levels in order to mitigate agency 
problems, a firm can tie manager’s compensation to performance.15 Almost a decade ago, 
shareholders, led by institutional investors, pressured corporate boards and executives to 
tie managers’ compensation to performance. Under this “pay for performance” ideal, 
many companies began aggressive stock option plans for managers and employees. 
Awarding stock options to employees and executives not only tied pay to performance 
but was also perceived to mitigate the principal-agent problem. Thus, while repurchases 
increased during the 1990s, there was an increasing reliance on stock options to 
compensate top managers.16  
                                                 
14 Although open-market transactions are conducted six times as frequently as fixed-price tender-offers and 
Dutch-auction combined, the market value of the repurchase is considerably less. The total market value of 
open-market repurchases from 1984-2001 is one-third the market value of the other two methods 
combined.  
15 Mehran, 1992, investigates the firm’s capital structure with management’s incentive plans, 
management’s equity ownership and several monitoring proxies, and finds results consistent with agency 
theory. 
16 Top 200 US companies allocated a record 15.2% of their shares to employee stock options as a percent of 
shares outstanding in 2000, compared to 7.5% in 1990 (Yang and Carlton 2002). Also executive equity 
holdings account for nearly 70% of CEO compensation and most of the shares are the result from the 
exercise of their stock options (Pearl Meyer & Partners, an executive compensation consulting firm). Also 
Bowen, 1996, reports in the Wall Street Journal that the 200 largest companies reserved more than ten 
percent of their common shares to be awarded to managers, which is an increase from six percent six years 
earlier. 
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Employees arguably have some informational advantage and there is, most likely, 
value in fortuitous timing of option grants and exercises.17 Yermack (1997) finds that 
managers receive stock-option grants shortly before good news announcements regarding 
earnings, and delay such grants until after bad news announcements. Yermack suggests 
that options are not so much an incentive device but rather a covert mechanism for self-
dealing. On the other side, compensation-based options do have a few value decreasing 
differences, including vesting restrictions and compensation based options that are non-
transferable. Employees also tend to exercise options early (American options) leaving 
some value unrealized. 
 Stock options can encourage managers to choose repurchases over conventional 
dividend payments because repurchases, unlike dividends, do not reduce the per-share 
value of the stock. Jolls (1998) finds that firms that relied heavily on stock-option based 
compensation are significantly more likely to repurchase their stock than firms that do 
not. Furthermore, Jolls and others attribute the growth in open-market repurchases to the 
increase in option grants.18  
The granting of options to both managers of firms and employees has been lauded 
as a sound performance-based compensation plan for firms.19 Employees, managers, 
board members and sometimes consultants have been granted stock options, usually at 
                                                 
17 See Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976, for discussion on imperfect information. 
18 Arnold and Gillenkirch, 2002; Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong, 2002; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Grullon 
and Michaely, 2002 and 2003; and Kahle, 2002. 
19 Contrary to the argument that pay should be tied to performance, Elayan, Lau, and Meyer, 2001, find that 
companies which adopt incentive compensation schemes do not outperform companies without incentive 
compensation schemes. 
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the current market price.20 The general argument for pay-for-performance is that 
managers and employees will work harder if a portion of their pay is incentive-based. 
The goal for employees is to profit from in-the-money options, which is likely to occur 
when stock prices are high. Companies presumably will pay smaller salaries and cash 
bonuses when options are substituted for direct compensation. Shareholders should 
benefit in this alignment of interest to increase the value of the firm. In an ideal world, as 
the firm’s stock price increases, employees and managers receive higher compensation as 
their options move in-the-money. Shareholders also benefit as the value of their shares 
increases.21 
Contrary evidence has been provided by Yermack (1995) in his investigation of 
why companies award stock options to their top managers.22 He tests nine agency and 
financial contracting theories using Tobit and panel data analysis and finds little 
explanatory power with any of these prevailing theories. Specifically, Yermack finds 
companies do not provide incentives from stock option awards in any significant 
association with the fraction of equity owned by the CEO. He also finds a negative 
association between incentives provided by stock options and the presence of growth 
opportunities which is counter to many other studies that suggest that firms with growth 
opportunities provide higher levels of CEO compensation. Furthermore, Yermack finds 
                                                 
20 According to generally accepted accounting standards firms only report the difference of option grant 
over the current market price as an expense during the year granted. As long as companies issue options at 
market price or out of the money, no expense needs to be recorded. Thus firms generally choose to issue at 
market. 
21 David Aboody, 1996, analyzes the value of employee stock options (ESO) and finds ESOs to be 
negatively correlated with the firm’s stock prices. In early option vesting years there is a positive effect on 
firm value, but vested options are considered a net cost to the firm’s shareholders. 
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no significant association between financial leverage and incentives from stock option 
awards despite prediction from John and John (1993). Thus, although pay for 
performance has been argued to be the optimal compensation structure, it appears that 
there is a general absence of management incentives in CEO compensation packages. 
 Interestingly, during most of the 1990s bull market, executives received huge 
compensation packages in the form of options even when their companies lagged behind 
stock market averages, reports the Wall Street Journal.23 Executives and employees were 
happy and investors were satisfied as long as the stock prices continued to increase. 
Unfortunately, there is no clear evidence that options generate better performance of a 
firm’s earnings, suggests the Wall Street Journal. Also, it appears that executive behavior 
changed in other less productive ways during that period, adds the Journal.24 Thus, 
although the argument for performance-based compensation is sound, the performance 
measure may need adjustment (for example, tied to an index) in order that the 
compensation costs do not outweigh their benefits (Gillan (2001)) and to force the firm to 
conduct ongoing repurchases to meet the option exercise demand. 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 Blasi, Kruse, and Berstein, 2003, argue that options can be effective only if they are granted to all 
employees and not just the top managers. 
23 Lee, Susan, 2002, The Ugly Option, Wall Street Journal (New York). 
24 One less productive management action has been the repricing of options. A consequence of later falling 
stock market prices was to make many employee and executive stock options essentially worthless, or to 
have been pulled “underwater”. This means that the exercise price of the options has fallen below the 
current market price of the underlying security. Many employees had accepted compensation packages that 
included less salary, in hopes of large option payoffs. As the stock prices dived and the employees lost 
compensation, many may have chosen to relocate to another firm where they could receive an option 
package with a low exercise price at the new firm and ultimately a higher probability of realizing a gain. 
Managers of firms were thus under pressure to reprice the options in order to keep talented employees. 
Repricing options is a process of canceling existing outstanding options and reissuing at a lower strike 
price. Jin and Meulbroek, 2001, find that underwater options remain effective and conclude that restoring 
incentive alignment is not a sufficient reason for repricing options. 
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Kahle (2002) examines how stock options may have affected the firm’s decision 
to repurchase shares and finds that firms announce repurchases when executives have 
large numbers of options outstanding. So, during the 1990s as executive compensation 
increased in the form of options25 firms repurchased their stock at increasing prices. 
Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong (2002) substantiate this by finding that managers do 
repurchase shares to avoid the dilutive effects of employee stock option plans. 
Furthermore, the authors add that since repurchases involve paying out cash, thus 
reducing the future dollar return on that cash, the repurchase will ultimately result in 
reducing future earnings per share by reducing earnings. Thus, the original argument of 
initiating a repurchase to counteract dilution to presumably increase or at least maintain 
earnings per share may, in fact, in the long run decrease earnings per share. This is 
substantiated by Fenn and Liang (1998), who find negative relationships between their 
proxies for investment opportunity and marginal financing costs and repurchases. Lie and 
McConnell (1998) state that when firms repurchase shares to avoid dilution relating to 
option exercise there is a wealth transfer from shareholders to employees, since the cost 
of repurchase is much higher than the price at which employees exercise their options. 
Klassen and Sivakumar (2001) argue that when repurchases are conducted because 
managers believe their stock to be undervalued, then positive information is conveyed to 
the market. A repurchase to reduce dilutive effects does not convey new information 
about future firm performance and on one hand should be irrelevant. In this case we 
should not see any abnormal return reactions with a repurchase announcement to 
                                                 
25 Der Howanesian, Mara, 2002, The Buyback Boomerang, Businessweek. 
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counteract dilution. However, repurchasing shares does not effectively reduce economic 
dilution because the firm gives up a portion of its assets to repurchase. Thus, 
repurchasing to avoid dilution may have the negative effect of passing up better 
investment opportunities. For these reasons, I suggest that repurchasing shares to 
counteract dilution should not result in positive stock price returns reactions and may, in 
fact, be negative, especially in the long run when the results of foregoing investment 
opportunities are realized. 
Klassen and Sivakumar (2001) note that the funding of stock option programs by 
repurchasing shares is an expensive strategy and suggest that option exercise could 
represent a real cost to the firm as a wealth transfer from shareholder to employee. The 
Economist (1/27/01) reports a study by Smithers and Co. that documents that if options 
had been accounted for at the time they were granted, the profits of large-listed 
companies in 1998 would have been two-thirds lower. Klassen and Sivakumar note that 
repurchases increased from 1995-1999 when stock prices were soaring and then dropped 
during 2000. This implies firms were conducting buybacks as prices were increasing and 
stopped when their stocks became cheap. This is in contradiction to the often-cited 
undervaluation hypothesis. 
Yermack (1997) finds that managers receive stock option grants shortly before 
good news announcements and delay such grants until after bad news announcements. 
Yermack suggests that options are not so much an incentive device, but rather a covert 
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mechanism for self-dealing.26 Other researchers have suggested that managers behave 
opportunistically at the expense of shareholders. For example, Healy (1995) finds that 
firms are more likely to accrue discretionary expenses during years in which their 
operating income exceeds the upper limits or falls below lower limits of managers' 
accounting-based bonus plans. In another study, Jolls (1998) finds that option 
compensated managers substitute stock repurchases for dividend payments because 
managers normally do not share in dividends paid by the firm. 
Fenn and Liang (1998) study whether firms substitute repurchases for dividends 
when management options are at stake. They find that share repurchases are positively 
related to management stock options and dividend increases are negatively related for the 
dividend-paying firms. Furthermore, Fenn and Liang found no statistical relationship 
between repurchases and management options for the non-dividend paying firms. In a 
similar vein, Lambert, Lanen and Larcher (1989) find that firms pay lower dividends 
after the adoption of stock option plans. 
Liang and Sharpe (1999) study S&P 500 firms to establish the effects of firms that 
repurchase and exercise stock options. They find, in a 1994-1998 sample of S&P 500 
firms, gross repurchases reduced shares outstanding two percent annually; however, 
owing to the exercise of employee stock options, only about half of those shares were 
                                                 
26 Specifically, Yermack, 1997, finds that the average abnormal stock return to the CEO is $30,000 after 20 
trading days and $48,900 after 50 days. As an aside, options are awarded once a year by a compensation 
committee of the board acting under the authority of periodic shareholder votes. The options details are 
only disclosed in annual proxy statements, which could be as much as 15 months after the grant. 
Shareholder votes usually occur once every five years and Yermack, 1997, reports that as of his paper a 
NYSE's proxy expert had no knowledge of one ever being rejected. 
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actually retired.  According to Liang and Sharpe, when firms repurchase shares to avoid 
dilution relating to option exercise, there is a wealth transfer from shareholders to 
employees since the cost of repurchasing is higher than the employee exercise price. This 
would increase employee compensation and reduce the firm’s future net income, thus 
decreasing earnings per share available to the stockholder. As an aside, a firm that 
chooses to issue new shares to facilitate option exercise would also experience a decrease 
in earnings per share due to the increase in number of shares rather than the decrease to 
earnings. 
In a September 2002 Business Week article, Der Howanesian (2002) suggests that 
stock repurchases can enrich executives’ compensation at investors’ expense. During the 
1990s, cash rich firms purchased their stock at record high prices. Historically, buybacks 
were supposed to be a good use of free cash flow and, as such, repurchasing activity 
made sense when a firm’s stock price was depressed, such as the period following the 
October 1987 crash. But, did it make sense during the earlier 1990s when stock prices 
were booming? 
Thus, are buybacks simply a way for corporate executives to maximize their own 
wealth, as Business Week suggests? Since it is well-known that repurchase 
announcements are met with positive stock price return reactions, can executives boost 
the price in the short-term and then sell their shares at a profit? This would have the 
effect of transferring wealth from the shareholder or owners of the firm to the executives. 
If this is the case, shouldn’t open-market repurchase announcements be met with possibly 
a negative, or at least non-positive, stock price return reaction? 
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Repurchases and Managerial Ownership 
Researchers have suggested that the agency problem between owners and 
managers can be mitigated if the managers have equity ownership. Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990) examine inside directors’ appointments and find that stock market 
reactions depend upon director ownership levels. Specifically, they find negative 
reactions when inside directors own less than five percent of the firm’s common stock, 
significantly positive when their ownership level is between five percent and 25 percent, 
and insignificantly different from zero when ownership exceeds 25 percent. Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny attribute this to the alignment of interests in the middle ownership 
range, but costs of entrenchment outweighing the benefits of alignment of interests at 
high levels of ownership. Thus, it appears agency issues may be mitigated when 
managers own between five and 25 percent of the company’s stock. At ownership levels 
of less than five percent, agency issues are a valid concern. 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) separate a large sample into high growth and low 
growth firms and investigate Tobin’s q, debt, and equity ownership and find that firms 
with low (high) investment opportunity that q is positively (negatively) related to debt. 
McConnell and Servaes regress q with equity ownership and find some support that 
equity ownership is more important in low growth firms. This follows the Jensen (1986) 
argument that firms with poor investment opportunities are more likely to overinvest in 
negative net present value projects if free cash flow is available. Concluding, many other 
researchers have investigated the relationship between corporate value and the allocation 
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of shares among corporate insiders and while results differ there is a consensus that 
allocation of equity ownership matters.27 
Hubbard and Palia (1996) propose the diversification-control hypothesis to 
address the impact of managers’ private benefits of control as it relates to the bid 
premium paid in a merger. They develop a model and empirically show that 1) managers 
will indulge in non value-maximizing activities and will overpay the merger premium 
when the managers have a low ownership stake; 2) managers’ and owners’ interest are 
aligned as the ownership stake is increased and there is a negative relationship between 
the bid premium and managerial ownership; and 3) at significantly high ownership levels 
managers are again willing to pay high premiums due to private benefits of control. This 
gives rise to a non-monotonic relationship of first increasing (alignment of interest and 
value-maximizing behavior) and then decreasing as also shown by Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990). 
 Ofek and Yermack (1997) argue that although boards intend for stock options to 
boost the ownership positions of managers, there is no assurance that executive will 
behave accordingly. For example, modern portfolio theory suggests that managers 
receiving additional stock should sell those shares or shares they already own in order to 
diversify away the unsystematic risk associated with concentrating wealth in a single 
asset. Furthermore, this risk is higher for managers than ordinary investors because of 
their human capital investment. Ofek and Yermack find that executives sell stock during 
                                                 
27 For example see Holderness and Sheehan, 1988, and Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, See also Lewellen, 
Loderer, and Rosenfeld, 1985, who find that returns to acquiring firms are positively correlated with the 
equity stake of the acquirer's top managers or low management ownership is associated with low returns. 
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years that they receive new options. Although consistent with modern portfolio theory, 
selling already owned shares counteracts the board’s objectives. Specifically they find 
that, on average, executives will sell 180 shares of stock for every 1000 new stock 
options awarded. Additionally, executives retain virtually none of the shares they acquire 
with the exercise of the options 
Thus, it appears that the granting of options may not have the intended purpose of 
aligning managers’ and stockholder’ objectives. Although option granting may not be the 
optimal method of turning managers into owners, we do know that ownership matters..28 
In the spirit of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and of Raad and Wu (1994), I expect 
that the repurchase announcement should be positive for firms with high free cash flows, 
for it should align managerial and stockholders interests. However, if a firm has low 
managerial ownership and high free cash flows a repurchase could either help control the 
potential agency issues (good use of free cash flows) or it could be that the manager with 
significant options has the incentive to manipulate the firm’s stock price with a 
repurchase announcement.  
Another group which may have the incentive to manipulate and also the means to 
manipulate would be firms with high managerial ownership (entrenched managers) and 
high free cash flow. This group may be able to manipulate the firm’s stock price in the 
short-run but may do poorly in the long-term.  
                                                 
28Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; McConnell and Servaes, 1995; and Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997 
Contrary to these and other researchers, Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999, use panel data to show that 
we cannot conclude that a firm’s performance is effected by managerial ownership. 
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At the other extreme are firms with high managerial ownership and low free cash 
flows. Firms with these characteristics should not be susceptible to agency problems and 
thus should not require stock options to align shareholder and manager incentives.29 In 
these firms the stock option grant may be an unnecessary and expensive compensation 
package. Furthermore, we may find the repurchase announcement to be non-positive 
because options may serve to exacerbate the entrenchment problem. 
I have made a theoretical argument that ownership matters and different levels of 
managerial stock ownership and levels of option grants can provide different managerial 
incentives. However, I still may not be able to disentangle the opportunistic behavior of 
managers. In other words, a self-serving manager who manipulates the price of the firms 
stock with an increase in market price is not necessarily acting against shareholders 
interests. In this case, it would be possible for everyone to gain. 
In reference to payouts and ownership stakes, Fenn and Liang (2001) show that 
the highest firm payouts (dividends and repurchases) occur in firms that are more likely 
to have agency problems (for example, low executive ownership and high free cash 
flows). Jolls (1998) shows that the growth in repurchases is tied to the increase in options 
granted. It would appear that the firms that should derive the most benefit for granting 
options would be the firms with the greatest potential for agency problems. This would 
support significantly positive stock price reactions of firms announcing repurchase offers 
to cover options if the firm also had low managerial ownership and high free cash flows. 
                                                 
29 Although, these managers may not require options for agency mitigating problems, they may require 
options for what may be considered fair compensation in their industry. 
   
 28
Stock option grants may not depress current earnings directly; however, they will 
reduce future earnings. If a firm does not repurchase any shares, stock options will have a 
dilutive effect upon subsequent earnings per share. When a firm repurchases its stock, it 
reduces the number of shares over which earnings are divided. The cash used to finance 
the repurchase will reduce paid-in-capital, but will not directly affect earnings. Thus, 
some firms may have the incentive to combine on-going share repurchase programs with 
option programs to undo the erosion to earnings per share. Stock option grants should 
align shareholder objectives with firm managers’ objectives. However, there must be a 
trade-off between the benefit of aligning incentives and the cost of implementing or 
paying for the options as they become due. For this trade-off reason, I expect to have a 
positive correlation between some lower level of option granting as incentives are aligned 
and compensation costs are not too high and a negative correlation at some higher level 
of option granting as the costs of the grants outweigh the alignment benefit. As an 
example of a high level of option granting, Barron’s Online reports that Lehman Brothers 
issued 26 million options in 200230.  
In summary, there have been numerous studies surrounding repurchase 
announcements and the effects on firm performance and stock price reactions. Although 
                                                 
30 Barron’s Online reports that, “The Street's most lavish options issuer continues to be Lehman Brothers. 
In 2002, it issued 26 million options, fully 10% of its shares outstanding, up from 21 million in the prior 
year. Lehman's reported compensation last year was 51% of revenues, but if the effective value of the 
options is factored in, that cost rises to almost 60% -- a large wealth transfer from public shareholders to 
Lehman employees that isn't captured in the company's income statement. Lehman spent heavily on share 
repurchases last year to offset its lavish option grants, acquiring $1.5 billion of stock, more than its $1 
billion of net income”. 
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some studies have suggested a downside to repurchasing activity,31 I am not aware of a 
study that attempts to disentangle the repurchase announcement to distinguish between 
the purposes of the repurchase announcement. My study will attempt to make this 
distinction by sub-sampling stock repurchase announcements as specified in the 
following sections. 
 
Prediction, Data and Methodology 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Most research conducted on the repurchase announcement event finds that stock 
price returns are significantly positive on the event date and positive stock returns 
continue to persist for up to four years post the event date. These results are documented 
without questioning the motivation or the purpose of the repurchase. This research 
examines the purpose of the repurchase and I question whether a repurchase 
announcement is always viewed as “good news” and be met with significantly positive 
stock price reactions. 
Indeed, there are possibly opportunistic reasons for firms to repurchase their own 
stock. Firms may repurchase their own stock to fund an acquisition, to counteract dilution 
effects and to cover options. In very basic terms, when a firm grants options it will 
ultimately either have to increase its number of shares, which will reduce earnings per 
share, or it can avoid this potential earnings dilution by both granting options and 
repurchasing its shares. On the one hand, if option granting really does mitigate agency 
                                                 
31 Kahle, 2002; Yermack, 1997; and Evans and Gentry, 1999. 
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problems between the owners and managers of the firm and if repurchasing shares also 
has the desired effect to mitigate earnings dilution, then both activities could be positive 
news. On the other hand, it can be questioned whether repurchasing to counteract dilution 
is nothing more than an earning scheme by management. Thus, repurchasing to 
counteract dilution may maintain a constant number of shares outstanding (denominator 
in earning per share); however, earnings may be reduced (numerator) resulting in reduced 
earnings per share. Thus, when employee stock options are granted the value of the 
existing owners’ stake in the firm is reduced.  
For these reasons, I do not think that a repurchase announcement should always 
be good news. Specifically, there are situations such as the funding of an acquisition, the 
covering of employee options, and the counteracting of dilution issues, that should not 
necessarily be met with as positive stock price reactions as those signaling undervaluation 
or enhancing stockholder value. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The abnormal return will be less-positive or non-positive for firms announcing 
repurchases for opportunistic reasons such as non-value-enhancing acquisitions, 
counteracting dilution effects, and covering options as compared to the 
cumulative abnormal returns for all other repurchase motives. 
 
 I have hypothesized that the return for some repurchasing activities will be less 
positive or perhaps non-positive. It is possible that this may not be immediately 
recognized or even distinguishable in the short run. Although the manager of a firm may 
be acting opportunistically, that does not necessarily preclude that his or her actions are 
aligned with the interests of shareholders. In other words, if no difference in the stock 
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price reactions of different types of repurchase objectives are observed at the 
announcement date, it may be that these types of repurchases are still consistent with 
either the free cash flow hypothesis or the undervaluation hypothesis and distinguishing 
them may be an arduous task. 
Many researchers have shown the persistence in positive abnormal returns 
following stock repurchase announcements. This is a puzzle in that if a repurchase signals 
undervaluation or is an appropriate use of free cash flow, then positive announcement day 
reactions may be expected, but the reactions should not persist three- to four-years post 
event.32  Furthermore, if the repurchases are conducted for opportunistic objectives, we 
should not see positive long-term abnormal returns.  
Hypothesis 2 
 
The abnormal long-run returns will be less positive or non-positive for firms 
announcing repurchases for opportunistic reasons such as an acquisition, 
counteracting dilution effects, and the covering of options as compared to the 
cumulative abnormal returns for all other repurchase motives. 
 
A lack of results or mixed results from hypotheses one and two could suggest that 
all repurchases on average are good news and positive stock price reactions should be 
anticipated. However, if that were the case firms should announce repurchases even more 
frequently than they do, for there is no cost associated with a false signal.33 Another 
possibility is that opportunistic repurchases do exist but their existence is dependent upon 
                                                 
32 Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995. 
33 Jagannathan and Stephens, 2001, find that the market reactions to frequent vs. infrequent repurchase 
announcements are consistent with undervaluation. Infrequent repurchasers have lower market-to-book 
ratios suggesting that they are more likely to be undervalued, are preceded by negative abnormal returns, 
and are on average greeted with a stronger stock price return reaction than the frequent repurchasers. Thus, 
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managers’ ownership levels and whether or not managers and shareholders have similar 
goals. 
I suggest a positive relationship at low-option levels and a negative relationship at 
high-option levels. This is similar in spirit to the work by Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) 
noted earlier. However, in their paper the costs are due to entrenchment, whereas in this 
paper I am suggesting a wealth transfer. 
  As a general clarification, compensation-based options are different from 
exchange-traded options. One value-enhancing feature to the compensation-based option 
is its longer maturity date (five years may be typical). Thus, the value of options 
outstanding can be substantial. The number of options outstanding at the end of year is 
disclosed on firms’ proxy statements (since 1992); however, balance sheets do not 
include an allowance for this liability.  
In summary, I plan to test my hypothesis using standard event study methodology 
using the constant mean return and the market model to measure abnormal returns with 
the announcement of the repurchase. I plan to control the test with free cash flow 
variables, ownership variables, executive option levels, growth variables, firm size and 
the frequency of the repurchases by a firm. 
 
Sample 
 
The sample of repurchases is collected from Securities Data Corporation’s 
Mergers and Acquisitions database and Repurchases database. I begin by collecting all 
                                                                                                                                                 
although the market generally views all repurchases favorably frequent repurchasers are greeted less 
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open-market, Dutch-auction, and fixed-price self-tender offers with original 
announcement dates between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 2002. The Repurchases 
database began data accumulation with 1994 repurchases. My sample of repurchase firms 
dating from 1994 through 2002 was collected from this database. Prior to 1994, 
repurchases were obtained from the Mergers and Acquisition database. I found a firm 
choosing to repurchase its shares to be any firm which made an acquisition of its same 
cusip number. Thus, any firm with the same cusip number for the acquirer and the target 
firm is considered to have made a repurchase. The Securities Data Corporation database 
includes all corporate transactions involving at least five percent of the ownership of a 
company where the transaction was valued at $1 million or more (after 1992, deals of any 
value are covered) or where the value of the transaction was undisclosed. Financial firms 
(SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4910-4949) were removed 
because they are believed to face a different incentive structure around repurchase 
activity. Imposing these restrictions results in an initial sample of 3999 firm repurchase 
announcements including 177 Dutch-auction, 373 fixed-price tender offers and 3,449 
open-market repurchases. Table 2-1 shows descriptive statics for my sample repurchase 
firms. 
 Along with repurchase announcements and the type of repurchase conducted, I 
have also obtained several more variables from the Securities Data Corporation’s 
Repurchase database which have been available since 1995.34 These variables include a 
                                                                                                                                                 
enthusiastically. 
34 I use the sample dating from 1988 to show the frequency of open-market repurchases, Dutch-auction and 
fixed-price tender offers. However, all empirical analysis is conducted with repurchases initiated between 
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purchase code, SIC codes, and the total shares repurchased in number, dollar value or as a 
percent of the common shares outstanding. The purpose codes indicate a firm-reported 
description of the reason why the repurchase was conducted. The codes are to support an 
acquisition, to avoid dilution of earnings per share, to support an employee benefit plan, 
to enhance shareholder value, to support a stock option plan and to signal undervaluation. 
These codes will determine the motivation and the effect of the different repurchase 
announcements. 
 I sub-divided my repurchase sample into four levels of executive stock option 
value (zero value of exercisable options, low value (option value is less than 20 percent 
of the executive’s salary and bonus) medium value (value of exercisable options is 
between 20 and 150 percent of the executive’s salary and bonus); and a high option level 
(value of exercisable options is greater than 150 percent of the executive’s salary and 
bonus)). Slightly over 60 percent of my sample of firms granted zero options and thus I 
placed those firms in one group. The low, medium, and high option levels were 
established by placing one-third of the remaining firms in each group. The stated 
percentile of options granted levels are simply the way the groups fell from this 
arrangement. The option data is obtained from the Standards and Poor’s ExecuComp 
database. This database contains information on executive compensation and ownership 
for the S&P 1500 companies (S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Smallcap 600 
indices), beginning in 1992. Using this database, I can calculate the total number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
1995 and 2002. Thus, all statistical testing is conducted with the sample collected through Securities Data 
Corporation’s Repurchase database. 
   
 35
options held by top executives, the number of exercisable and unexercisable options held 
by top executives, and the shares owned by the same executives.  
In addition to my hypothesis variables, I include several control variables. Table 
2-2 shows both control and hypothesis variables and the expected sign of their estimated 
coefficients. Table 2-3 explains the definitions of the variables used in table 2-2 along 
with theoretical justifications for the predicted signs. 
 
Methodology  
 
The research design to test my hypotheses uses a market model using both 
ordinary least squares and Scholes-Williams beta estimation and constant mean return 
model to calculate abnormal returns. I use daily data and my periods of interest are the 
pre-event window (-30, +2), the announcement window (-1, +1) and post-event periods 
of (+2, +30), two-years and three-years after the announcement.35  
 
Market model and constant mean return model 
I use event-study methodology using the constant mean return model and the 
market model estimated by both ordinary least square and the method of Scholes and 
Williams (1977) to measure abnormal returns (see Thompson (1995))36 The market 
model abnormal returns are defined as Ajt =  Rjt – (αj + βjRmt) where Ajt  is the abnormal 
return (or prediction error) for the common stock of the jth firm on day t, Rjt  is the rate of 
                                                 
35I conduct both a t-test and a z-test statistic to make inference about the significance of my results. Both of 
these test statistics are calculate with Eventus software (see appendix A) 
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return of the common stock of the jth firm on day t, αj and is the ordinary least squares 
estimate of α, βj is a parameter that measures the sensitivity of Rjt to the market index 
Rmt. The least squares estimation period ends 46 days before the event date and is 255 
days in length. The equally-weighted and value-weighted market indexes are both used as 
benchmarks in my study. The average abnormal return AARt is the sample mean. The 
cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as CART1T2 = (1/N) ΣΣ Ajt. In earlier drafts I 
also calculated buy-and-hold abnormal returns by compounding successive daily 
returns.37 However, this produced problematic results with questionable biases and thus 
those results have been omitted.38 I will show cumulative average abnormal returns for a 
pre-announcement period (-30, -2), event-day (-1, +1), and three post-event periods (+2, 
+30), (+31, two-years), (+31, three-years). 
I will also use the market model with the Scholes-Williams beta estimation. The 
beta estimator is βj = (βj bar + βj + βj+) / (1 + 2ρm) where βj bar is the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimate from the regression of Rjt on Rmt-1, βj  is the OLS estimate form 
the regression of Rjt on Rmt+1, and ρm is the estimated first-order autocorrelation of Rm. 
The market adjusted returns are simply the difference between the actual return 
and the return of the market or Ajt = Rjt – Rmt. The definitions of the average and 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 Thompson presents an excellent discussion of empirical methods of event studies in chapter 29 of 
Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Volume 9. The chapter cites numerous 
studies and provides details of the empirical methodology that I will follow. 
37 The buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated with the BUYHOLD command in eventus. Eventus 
computes buy-and-hold abnormal returns by compounding successive daily raw returns and market index 
returns, then adjusts the raw returns according to the abnormal return method used. The calculation for the 
buy-and-hold abnormal return follows: 
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38 See Canina, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1998 for a complete discussion. 
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cumulative average abnormal returns follow those for the market model abnormal 
returns. The abnormal returns are calculated with Eventus software. 
 
Cross-sectional model 
Theoretical models often suggest that there should be an association between the 
magnitude of abnormal returns and characteristics to the event observation. To 
investigate this, I will use a cross sectional regression of abnormal returns on 
characteristics, where Y, the dependent variable, is the observed CAR and X, the 
independent variables, are a matrix of characteristics. My X variables are shown in table 
2 with their predicted signs. The general regression equation is that the announcement 
day excess return = α + βj (characteristics). The cross-sectional model will be carried out 
through SAS. This requires separate regressions for each year. The general regression 
equation: 
CARit =  α1 + ΣγKTKi + α2 D2i + α3 D3i + φL PLi + β2 X2i + μit 
Where TK = time series dummies from 1988 through 2002 
D2i = 1 if Dutch-auction, 0 otherwise  
D3i = 1 if fixed-price, 0 otherwise 
PLi = purpose codes (ULV, DIL, ACQ, ESV, EBP, STP) 
X = all other firm characteristics (table 2) 
 Market-to-book asset ratios also serve as a proxy for investment opportunities 
(see e.g. Opler and Titman (1993)). All else being equal, higher market values suggest 
that the firm is not undervalued and, in fact, would make the repurchase of shares a more 
expensive undertaking. Thus, a high market-to-book (often referred to as a glamour 
stock) would suggest a negative correlation with repurchases. Alternatively, a low book-
to-market would predict a positive correlation with repurchases. 
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Repurchases may also be the choice cash distribution for temporary cash flow 
availability and not a permanent cash flow increase that would be more appropriately 
signaled by a dividend increase.39 Thus, if a firm chooses to repurchase rather than 
increase dividends, it may indicate only a temporary cash flow increase and not the more 
desirable permanent cash flow increase. Previous research has used debt/assets, book-to- 
market, net operating cash flow/assets and payout ratios (common dividends/net income) 
as controls. I will also include these controls. 
High debt levels may make managers more reluctant to distribute current cash 
flows. As leverage increases, the probability of financial distress and hence external 
financing costs increases. Reducing debt is an alternative use of disgorging free cash 
flow;40 thus firms that rely more on debt will be less likely to repurchase. I will control 
for this with the long-term debt to assets variable. 
Firms with high levels of free cash flow are at a greater risk of overinvesting and 
hence derive greater benefits from repurchasing their own stock. Also, firms with 
relatively low marginal financing costs can distribute more cash to shareholders knowing 
that if they must raise external funds in the future they will be able to do so relatively 
inexpensively. I include size as a proxy for financing costs and information asymmetry. I 
also include year indicator variables to control for exogenous differences in repurchases 
that occur over the sample period. I also control for the frequency of the repurchase 
announcement.41 
                                                 
39 Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach, 1998; Guay and Harford, 1999; and Gelb, 2000.  
40 Jensen, 1986, and Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997.  
41 Jagannathan, Murali, and Clifford P. Stephens, 2003, Motives For Multiple Open-Market Repurchase 
Programs, Financial Management 32, 71-91. find frequent repurchasers to be much larger, have 
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Announcing a repurchase to signal firm undervaluation conveys good news to the 
market. If undervaluation is the message being conveyed, managers can clearly signal 
this with the premium offered. I have included this distinction by the type of repurchase 
offered.42 
I expect all of the free cash flow control variables and the variables that suggest 
that the firm is undervalued to have positive estimated coefficients. If the underlying 
reason for the firm to make the repurchase decision is value-enhancing, it should be met 
with positive stock price reactions. This would be consistent with past research studies.43 
I include these variables to show both consistency with other research and as control 
variables to help distinguish between good news and no news or bad news repurchase 
announcements. 
Firms also self-report that repurchases are being carried out to enhance 
shareholder value. This term is ambiguous. The firm could be either signaling 
undervaluation or conducting a repurchase as an effective use of free cash flows. If firms 
are credibly announcing a repurchase to enhance shareholder value, then the repurchase 
should be met with a positive stock price reaction. 
 
Results 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
significantly less variation in operating income and have higher dividend payout ratios than infrequent 
repurchasers that are initiated by smaller firms with potentially higher degrees of asymmetric information. 
This suggests that smaller firms are more likely to repurchase for the positive motivation of signaling 
undervaluation. 
42Comment and Jarrell, 1991 document that the stronger the premium offered for shares, the stronger the 
signal of undervaluation and measure the undervaluation signal by the type of repurchase. 
43 Dann, 1981; Vermaelen, 1981; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 
1995; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998.  
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Table 2-4 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the opportunistic 
purposes of funding a stock option plan, for an acquisition and to counteract dilution. The 
CARs for the Pre-event window, at the announcement date and three post-announcement 
windows are shown using the ordinary least squares market model and the Scholes-
Williams market model in comparison to the equal-weighted and value-weighted CRSP 
market indexes. Consistent with others’ research, the pre-event abnormal returns are 
consistently significantly negative for all models and repurchase purposes. Past research 
has shown significantly positive announcement day returns. My research also shows 
consistent positive returns. However, Hypothesis 1 is supported in that the abnormal 
returns are less positive for the opportunistic repurchase plans. For example, with the 
market model the (-1, +1) window for the non-opportunistic repurchase plans has a CAR 
of 3.04 percent, whereas the stock-option repurchase plan, the plan to counteract dilution, 
and the plan to fund an acquisition have CARs of 2.22percent, 1.57 percent, and 1.82 
percent, respectively.  
Consistent with others, I generally find persistence in positive abnormal returns. 
Kahle (2002) found that firms that repurchased shares to fund employee stock options 
were not as positive as firms that did not repurchase to cover employee options. Contrary 
to her work, I found that the repurchases for funding an option plan performed well. 
Kahle compared firms that repurchased their shares with firms that increased their 
dividends during a four-year period. I choose to use a more robust sample of firms over 
an eight-year period that repurchased their shares for the purpose of funding an option 
plan, and compared my sample with both the CRSP equal-weighted and value-weighted 
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benchmark portfolios. I found the market model equal-weighted CARs were 23.41 
percent and 32.60 percent for the two-year and three-year post event windows. These 
results were all significant and very similar to the non-opportunistic plans (21.00 percent 
and 31.77 percent for the two-year and three-year post returns). My hypotheses proposed 
that opportunistic repurchase plans should not perform as well as undervaluation or free 
cash flow motivated plans. Although originally classified as an opportunistic plan, 
employee stock option plans are not serving only the firms’ executives’ interest, but may 
be serving all the firms’ employees. Later tables investigate the CEO’s options and 
ownership separately in order to distinguish opportunistic repurchases in a clearer 
framework. 
Loughran and Vijh find that stock acquirers earn 24.2 percent less than their 
matched firms, on average, using buy-and-hold returns over a five-year period; whereas 
cash acquirers earn 18.5 percent more than their matched firms. Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) find that bidders in mergers underperform for up to three years after the merger is 
complete. Thus, I hypothesized that firms that used a repurchase plan to facilitate an 
acquisition should not perform as well as the non-opportunistic repurchase plans. 
Although the shorter post-event time windows were less positive (non-significant), it is 
interesting that the post two-year and three-year returns were significantly positive 
(CARs of 29.42 percent and 41.49 percent, respectively). Thus, in the long-term, using a 
repurchase plan to finance an acquisition can be beneficial to the bidder and appears to 
act more like a cash-financed acquisition. This will be explored further in the next 
chapter. 
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Finally, the repurchase plan to counteract dilution reacted as predicted. All post-
event day CARs are small and not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the 
two-year (-2.51 percent) and three-year (-0.62 percent) are negative. Thus, to counteract 
dilution does not carry with it the positive abnormal returns that other repurchase 
purposes carry. 
In order to further differentiate the purpose of repurchase, I investigate the levels 
of free cash flows in my sample of firms and also the CEO ownership levels, and present 
the results in table 2-5A and 2-5B. These tables look at the difference in mean CARs for 
the pre-event window, at the announcement date and a short window of 30 days post 
announcement, and finally two-years and three-years post announcement. Table 2-5A 
presents a 3X5 matrix of free cash flows (high, medium and low) and ownership levels (0 
percent, less than 1 percent, 1 percent to 5 percent, 5 percent to 25 percent, and greater 
than 25 percent). The event-day CARs are interestingly negative for the high free cash 
flow and CEO stock ownership of greater than 25 percent (-4.82 percent), the medium 
level of free cash flow and greater than 25 percent ownership (-0.48 percent), and high 
free cash flows and ownership level between five percent and 25 percent (-0.45 percent).  
The p-values of .006 and .000 for the two-year and three-year indicate that these 
groups are significantly different from each other. At two-year post announcement the 
high free cash flow and five percent to 25 percent ownership group has a CAR of -47.5 
percent while there are strong positive CARs for low free cash flows and five percent to 
25 percent ownership (+86.6 percent) and low cash flows and zero ownership (+68.8 
percent). At three-year post event the high free cash flow and five percent to 25 percent 
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ownership group has a CAR of -44.2 percent and the high free cash flows and one 
percent to five percent group has a CAR of -5.23 percent, while there are strong positive 
CARs for low free cash flows and five percent to 25 ownership (+157.8 percent) and low 
free cash flows and zero ownership (81.5 percent).  
Table 2-5B presents a 3X3 matrix of free cash flows (high, medium and low) and 
ownership levels (high, medium and low). This table shows significant CARs at two-year 
and three-year post announcement. The only negative CARs shown are for the high free 
cash flow and low ownership group (-4.1 percent and -2.2 percent for post two-years and 
three-years respectively). Arguably this group has the most likely agency problems. The 
highest positive or best performing group is the low free cash flow and high ownership 
group (45.3 percent and 66.3 percent). This high ownership group presumably has little 
agency problems and thus is conducting the repurchase with both owners’ and managers’ 
objectives. Since cash flows are low, this group is likely to have a strong motivation to 
make the cash draining decision to repurchase its shares. It is likely that this group is 
making a very credible announcement that its current market price is low. 
I noted earlier the somewhat surprising result where repurchasing to fund an 
option plan has very similar results to all the non-opportunistic repurchases plans. Tables 
2-6 and 2-7 explore CEO options further to distinguish between funding for an employee 
option plan, which may not be opportunistic and the level of CEO options, which may 
lend itself to opportunistic motivations. 
In table 2-6 the repurchase sample is grouped by the value of the exercisable stock 
options held by the CEO divided by the CEO’s salary and bonus. Four groups were 
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determined: no options held, low option value (value of exercisable options is less than 
20 percent of the CEO’s salary and bonus), medium option value (value is between 20 
percent and 150 percent) and high option value (greater than 150 percent). The results in 
table 2-6 are not significant; however, it should be noted that the highest CARs in the 
long term are shown for the medium option levels. It may be that there exist an optimum 
level of option grants; high enough to motivate the manager to act in the owners’ interest 
and low enough to keep the cost of the option less than the motivational benefit. 
Table 2-7 presents a 5X4 matrix of CEO ownership levels (zero, less than one 
percent, one to five percent, five to 25 percent and greater than 25 percent) and option 
levels (no, low, medium and high). Panel A of this table shows significant CARs mean 
differences at two-year and three-year post announcement. The groups with negative 
CARs at two-year post repurchase announcement are: five-to 25 percent ownership and 
medium options (-54.8 percent); five-to-25 percent ownership and low options (-51.5 
percent); one-to-five percent ownership and zero options; (-9.9 percent), and zero 
ownership and no options (-0.1 percent). Due to some small sample size groups, the one 
to five percent ownership and zero options (n=122) is the only group with negative 
abnormal returns from which we can state that its negative returns are significant. The 
one-to-five percent ownership and zero options group also shows the same lackluster 
returns for the three-year post period of –10.8 percent. It is interesting to point out that 
the motivation to repurchase stock for any groups receiving no options cannot be to cover 
options. Thus the poor performance of the one-to-five percent group with no options is 
not a reflection of repurchasing due to the necessity of covering option commitments.  
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Focusing on just the two-year and three-year significant periods and only groups 
with greater than 20 observations, it is interesting to note that the best two-year return 
performance is the zero ownership and no option group. This group also has the 
distinction of being the second best performers at the three-year post announcement. This 
is consistent with option granting and CEO ownership not influencing performance or 
possibly the cost of the options does not outweigh the benefit of improved CEO 
performance. In other words it may be that option granting may increase the effort of the 
CEO, but not enough to affect the bottom line. This is an area that requires future study. 
The worst return performance group’s CEOs own one to five percent of the corporation’s 
stock and receive no options.  
Consistent with agency theory, the best group performance three-years post 
announcement is the one-to-five ownership group receiving a medium level of options. I 
expect this group’s interests would be well aligned with those of the shareholders because 
the managers have a moderate level of ownership, but not too much to be guilty of 
entrenchment and also receive a moderate level of options that should motivate the 
managers without the options costing so much too outweigh the benefit. 
Strong positive abnormal returns (two-year 52.4 percent and three-year 65.1 
percent) are found for the 1 percent to 5 percent CEO ownership and middle option group 
(n=34) and (two-year 39.3 percent and three-year 56.4 percent) for the zero ownership 
and no option (n=81). 
In order to address the problem of some of the small sample-sized groups, panel B 
of table 2-7 shows just seven groups formed by combining the medium and low option 
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groups, including the zero ownership groups with the less than one percent ownership 
groups, and blending the one to five percent ownership and five-to-25 percent ownership 
into a one-to-25 percent ownership group. The best performances are seen by the greater 
than 25 percent ownership group with two-year and three-year abnormal returns of 47.3 
percent and 41.2 percent respectively and the one-to-25 percent ownership and the 
medium and low option group with two-year and three-year abnormal returns of 44.4 
percent and 28.7 percent respectively. This group would be the optimal alignment of 
managers and stockholders interests group. Unexpected performance is observed by the 
one to 25 percent ownership with no option group with two-year and three-year abnormal 
returns of –0.4 percent and 9.7 percent, respectively. Thus, it appears that not only does 
the existing ownership level matter, but it is also necessary to provide future incentives in 
the form of moderate option grants. 
Much of the recent literature has focused attention on open-market conducted 
repurchases due to the growth in numbers and the increase in the value of the 
repurchases. Researchers have suggested that the repurchases are substitutes for 
dividends or are the direct result of compensation-based option grants and the needs of 
the firms to cover their options and avoid dilution effects. There is a general consensus 
that the increase in open-market repurchases is due at least in part to the growth in option 
grants.44 Thus, it is likely that the incentives for open-market repurchases have changed 
over time. However, what has happened to Dutch-auction and fixed-price tender offers 
over time? During the 1990s the frequency of initiation has not increased as open-market 
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repurchases have proliferated. Do firms still elect to use these methods to signal 
undervaluation (see Comment and Jarrell (1991) ) or as a takeover deterrent (see Persons 
(1994)? 
Table 2-8 displays the cumulative abnormal returns for the market model and 
Scholes-Williams model for the different types of repurchases, Dutch-auction, fixed-price 
tender offers and open-market repurchases. Data is shown yearly from 1995-2002.  
Using the results from the value-weighted market model returns, open-market 
repurchasers perform the worst prior to the announcement with a CAR mean over time of 
–7.17 percent and fixed-price offers performed well with a mean over time of 4.32 
percent. The at-announcement date abnormal returns for open-market repurchases range 
from a mean of 2.24 percent (1997) to 3.91 percent (2000), the smallest sample year. 
Both fixed price and Dutch-auction carry the higher event-day returns (fixed price ranges 
from 2.93 percent (1996) to 19.67 percent (1995) and Dutch auction from 4.55 percent 
(1995) to 13.23 percent (2002)) and at first glance there is no trend over time. 
A review of the long-term abnormal returns for Dutch auction repurchases shows 
erratic returns ranging from –25.52 percent (2001) to 86.9 percent (2000) for the two-
year post returns and ranging from-21.98 percent (1996) to 118.89 percent (2000) for 
three-years. The fixed price tender offers also show a wide range of returns over the 
years. The erratic returns over years for the Dutch-auction and fixed price tender offers is 
most likely influenced by small sample sizes ranging from as low as 6 events in a year to 
only a high of 24 repurchase announcements. 
                                                                                                                                                 
44 Jolls, 1998; Dittmar, 2000; Liang and Sharpe, 2000; Jagannathan and Stephens, 2001; Klassen and 
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Table 2-9 is a multi-model table addressing several hypotheses. The five panels 
A-E display the coefficients for pre-announcement, at the announcement and post-
announcement time periods (30 day, two-year and three-year). Six fixed-effects models 
are displayed in panel A. Although my hypotheses did not address the cumulative 
abnormal returns prior to the repurchase announcement, this panel shows some 
interesting results. The share percent variable (aggregate shares held by the CEO divided 
by the number of common shares outstanding) is significantly negative. This implies that 
the greater the percent of shares owned by the CEO the more negative the returns prior to 
making a repurchase announcement. The three-year least squares annual growth rate of 
net income variable is also significantly negative implying the higher the net income 
growth the more negative the cumulative abnormal returns prior to the repurchase 
initiation. Not surprisingly, firms that announce a repurchase due to undervaluation also 
have significantly negative CARs before the announcement, whereas firms that plan to 
fund a stock option plan perform well. 
My hypotheses questions opportunistic repurchases at the announcement date. 
Panel B displays 8 models addressing the event date announcement CARs. A look at the 
significant estimates reveals the stock value (aggregate value of stock options held by the 
CEO as a percentage of salary and bonus) is positive. This implies a direct relationship to 
the CEO’s option value and the stock’s return reaction at the repurchase event.  
As predicted, firms that announce a repurchase to counteract dilution effect do 
poorly (significantly negative in models six and eight). Also, predicted the non-
                                                                                                                                                 
Sivakumar, 2001; Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong, 2002; and Kahle, 2002. 
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opportunistic purpose of enhancing shareholder value is positive (significant in models 
one and two). I had also predicted, non-positive returns for both repurchases for 
acquisitions and for stock option plans. Although negative estimators appear in several 
models, none are significant. 
The strongest estimator is with firms announcing a Dutch-auction repurchase. 
Although the positive returns with a Dutch-auction is consistent with others’ research, it 
is not consistent to find the returns stronger than the fixed-price tender offers (negative, 
not significant) which carries a higher premium by virtue of its makeup. 
Panel C displays the short-term stock price reactions from two days to 30 days 
post announcement. For this period both control measures of price to book were 
significantly negative. As with the event time period, stock value is slightly positive. In 
the short-term none of the repurchase purposes show any significance. The frequency 
control is negative in one model and positive (not significant) in another. Dutch-auction 
and fixed-price repurchases show expected strong positive estimators; however, similar 
to the event day results the Dutch-auction firms have stronger positive returns than the 
fixed-price offers. 
Panels D and E show two-years and three-years post announcement, respectively. 
During these time periods, Dutch-auction and fixed-price repurchases no longer show any 
superiority in returns over open-market repurchase plans. Generally for both long-term 
periods net income to assets is slightly negative, share percent is slightly positive and 
both income growth and earnings per share growth negative.  
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Overwhelming the purpose to counteract dilution is significantly negative in all 
models as predicted by the hypotheses. However, the hypothesis also predicted negative 
return reactions for firms funding stock option plans. This did not bear out and in fact by 
three-years post announcement funding the stock option plan was significantly positive. I 
had also predicted that the purpose of funding an acquisition would have the negative 
results found with most acquisition research. This estimator although generally negative 
was only significant in one model. 
Two surprisingly results of slightly negative returns at three-years post repurchase 
announcement for the purpose of enhancing shareholder value and for the purpose of 
undervaluation. It appears that the manager’s purpose of repurchase did not occur. 
In summary, the purpose to counteract dilution is strongly negative in all models. 
This supports the argument that opportunistic repurchases do not perform as well as other 
repurchases. Contrary to the hypothesis, I again find that stock option plans have 
significantly positive long-term cumulative abnormal returns. The acquisition motivated 
repurchase is negative, as expected, but not significant. In the long-term, whether the 
repurchase was completed with a Dutch auction or fixed price tender offer was not 
significant.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the repurchase announcement matters. At the announcement date 
manager’s intention of avoiding dilution is significantly negative and enhancing 
shareholder value is significantly positive. However, more interesting results are 
observed at two-years and three-years post announcement. Counteracting dilution is not a 
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good reason to conduct a repurchase and although not as strongly negative, enhancing 
shareholder value does not bear out its announcement promise. Consistent with a rich 
history of acquisition work, conducting an acquisition in conjunction with a repurchase 
seems to carry the negative attributes of the acquisition-driven motivation. This will be 
explored further in the next chapter. 
The strongest positive reason to conduct a repurchase is to initiate or fund an 
employee stock option plan. Both employee benefit plans and stock option plans carry 
positive abnormal returns well into future time periods. This is contrary to the results 
found by Kahle (2002). Although it was expected that stock options would fall under 
opportunistic CEO behavior, very different results were found. A probable explanation is 
that stock options not only benefit the CEO but also employees and outside shareholders. 
Furthermore, when the ownership structure of the sample of repurchase firms was 
investigated, a few unexpected results surfaced. For example, the largest positive 
abnormal returns were found for a subsample of firms in which the CEOs had no stock 
ownership and no option grants. It is not known whether these CEOs have an alternative 
form of incentive based pay or if the cost of the options simply outweighs the benefit of 
improved CEO performance. 
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 Table 2- 1      Types of Repurchase Announcements 
 Number of Repurchase Announcements 
 Dutch-auction Fixed-price Open Market 
    
1988 17 36 136 
1989 16 56 279 
1990 6 51 396 
1991 3 52 115 
1992 8 36 114 
1993 5 37 260 
1994 7 38 408 
1995 9 8 493 
1996 17 11 691 
1997 21 14 664 
1998 24 6 647 
1999 18 14 415 
2000 17 13 320 
2001 9 9 177 
2002 11 16 399 
Total 188 397 5515 
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Table 2- 2      Hypothesized Relationships 
Hypothesized relationships between repurchase event return and firm characteristics 
 
   
Hypothesis Variable Predicted Sign
   
Hypothesis variables   
Offset dilution           Fully diluted eps/basis eps - 
 Dummy variable for firms reporting as purpose - 
Acquisition Dummy variable for firms reporting as purpose - 
Managerial  CEO Equity Ownership - 
Ownership  Share Ownership Value - 
 Share Ownership Value + Stock Option Value - 
Control variables    
Free cash Operating income before depreciation/assets + 
 
Net income before taxes and minority 
interest/assets + 
 
Net income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations/assets  + 
 
Net income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations less preferred 
dividends/assets  + 
Under-valuation Book-to-market + 
 Dummy variable for frequent repurchasers - 
 Dummy variable for firms reporting as purpose + 
Signaling Type of Repurchase Fixed  +++ 
  Dutch  ++ 
  Open    +  
Enhance Sh. Value  Dummy variable for firms reporting as purpose + 
Risk Beta + 
 Leverage: Long-term debt/assets + 
                Long-term debt/market value + 
                Debt/Assets + 
Other Controls Size - 
 Year ? 
  Dummy variable for frequent repurchases - 
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Table 2- 3      Variable Definitions 
 
Acquisition dummy variable = dumACQ = SDC repurchase purchase code ACQ. 
 
Beta = CRSP beta 
 
Black Scholes option value = BlkVal = The aggregate value of stock options granted to 
the executive during the year as valued using S&P's Black Scholes methodology 
(ExecuComp BLK_VALU). 
 
DA = Repurchase announcement was a Dutch-auction offer. 
 
Debt/Assets = Total debt (Compustat DLTT + LCT) / assets (Compustat TA) 
 
Dilution dummy variable = dumDIL = SDC repurchase purchase code DIL.  
 
Employee Benefit Plan dummy variable = dumEBP = SDC repurchase purchase code 
EBP. 
 
Enhance shareholder value dummy variable = dumESV = SDC repurchase purchase 
code ESV. 
 
EpsDil-1 = the diluted eps/basis eps for the year prior to the repurchase announcement. 
EpsDil_0 = = the diluted eps/basis eps for the year of the repurchase announcement= 
Fully diluted eps/basis eps   =Fully diluted reported since December 15, 1997 (APB 
opinion No. 15 and Financial Accounting Standards No. 128) Basic EPS is earning 
available to common shareholders divided by the weighted average of shares 
outstanding. Diluted EPS increase the number of shares in the denominator to reflect 
the dilutive effects of convertible securities and stock options and adds back to earnings 
the interest payments that would not have to be made by the firm upon the conversion 
of bonds/preferred stock to common stock.  
 
EPS growth = EPSgrow = the three-year least squares annual growth rate of Net 
Income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations less preferred dividend 
requirements (ExecuComp EPSEX3LS). 
 
Exercisable unexercised options = The number of unexercised options that the 
executive held at the end of the year that were vested options (ExecuComp 
UEXNUMEX). 
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Table 2- 3      Variable Definitions (Continued) 
 
Exercised options = Soptexsh = the number of options exercised by the executive 
during the year (ExecuComp SOPTEXSH). 
 
Exercised options value = Soptexer = the net value realized from exercising options. It 
is the difference in value between the exercise price of the options and the market 
price of the company's stock on the date of exercise (ExecuComp SOPTEXER/1000).
 
Exercised to total available options = Exercised options (SOPTEXSH) / Exercised 
options + exercisable unexercised (SOPTEXSH + UEXNUMEX) This gives the 
percentage of options exercised that were exercisable (vested). 
 
FP = Repurchase announcement was a Fixed-price tender offer. 
 
Frequent Repurchaser = Freq = Firm made more than one repurchase announcement 
during the year. 
 
Less Frequent Repurchases = Somefreq =  Firm made more than one repurchase 
during the three-year period, but not more than one during the year. 
 
Long-term debt/assets = long-term debt (Compustat DLT) / assets (Compustat TA) 
 
Long-term debt/market value = long-term debt (Compustat DLT) / market value 
(Compustat MKVALF) 
 
Market value = MktVal = market value (Compustat MKVALF/1000). 
 
Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations/assets = 
ExecuComp NIBEX/Assets 
 
Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations less preferred 
dividends/assets = NI/assets = ExecuComp NIAC/Assets. 
 
Net income before taxes and minority interest/assets = ExecuComp PRETAX/Assets 
 
NI growth = net income growth = The 3-year least squares annual growth rate of Net 
Income (ExecuComp NI3LS) 
 
Operating income before depreciation/assets = ExecuComp OIBD/Assets 
 
Operating Income growth = IncGrow = The three-year least squares annual growth of 
Operating Income before depreciation (ExecuComp OIBD3LS). 
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Table 2- 3      Variable Definitions (Continued) 
 
Option grant value = Soptval = the aggregate value of all options granted to the CEO 
during the year as valued by the company (ExecuComp SOPTVAL). 
 
Payout ratio = Total common dividends (item 21) / Net income 
 
Percent Sought = Total share repurchased (SDC total shares repurchased) / Total 
shares outstanding (SDC Number of securities outstanding) 
 
Purpose Code: The code describing the purpose of the repurchase program. Examples 
are: to enhance shareholder value (ESV) to offset dilution (DIL) to support a stock 
option program (STP), to indicate undervaluation (ULV), to fund and acquisition 
(ACQ), for an employee benefit plan (EBP), and for general business (GEN).  
 
Price to book = The market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where 
the market value of assets is the book value of assets plus the market value of equity 
(Compustat item #24 times Compustat item #25) minus the book value of equity. 
PrcBk-1 = Price to book for the year ending prior to the repurchase announcement. 
PrcBk_0 = Price to book for the year of the repurchase announcement. 
 
Share % = CEO equity  = The aggregate shares held by the CEO divided by the 
number of common shares outstanding (ExecuComp SHROWN/SHRSOUT) 
 
Share Ownership Value = Market value of the common shares held by executive 
divided by the executive's salary and bonus (ExecuComp PRCC*SHROWN/TCC) 
 
Share Ownership Value + Stock Option Value = Market value of the common shares 
held by executive plus the aggregate value of stock options granted to the executive 
during the year as valued using S&P's Black Scholes methodology divided by the 
executive's salary and bonus (ExecuComp (PRCC*SHROWN + BLK_VALU)/TCC) 
 
Stock Option Plan dummy variable = dumSTP = SDC repurchase purchase code STP.
 
Stock Option Value = StkVal = The aggregate value of stock options granted to the 
executive during the year as valued using S&P's Black Scholes methodology divided 
by the executive's salary and bonus (ExecuComp (BLK_VALU)/TCC). 
 
Type of Repurchase = SDC Technique code. OP = open market, DA = Dutch=auction, 
and FPOL = fixed-price tender-offer 
 
Undervaluation dummy variable = dumUVL = SDC repurchase purchase code UVL. 
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Table 2- 4      Returns to Repurchase Purpose        
Cumulative Abnormal Market model returns (CARs) for both equal and 
value weighted portfolios of all firms Announcing Repurchase Plans to 
Fund a Stock Option Plan (n=482, beta = 1.06) 
 Market Model Scholes-Williams Market Model 
Window Equal Wt   Value Wt   Equal Wt   Value Wt   
-30, -2 -3.82% *** -4.87% *** -4.14% *** -5.04% *** 
-1,+1 2.22% *** 2.02% *** 2.15% *** 1.97% *** 
+2,+30 1.98% ** 1.67% * 1.93% ** 1.62% * 
+31,+504 23.41% *** 24.20% *** 21.46% *** 23.14% *** 
+31,+756 32.60% *** 33.88% *** 29.96% *** 33.03% *** 
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01 
  
Cumulative Abnormal Market model returns (CARs) for both equal and 
value weighted portfolios of all firms Announcing Repurchase Plans to 
Fund an Acquisition (n=96, beta = 0.75) 
 Market Model Scholes-Williams Market Model 
Window Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
-30, -2 -2.84%  -2.67%  -1.14%  -3.64%  
-1,+1 1.57% ** 1.68% *** 1.67% ** 1.56% ** 
+2,+30 0.91%  1.97%  1.05%  1.27%  
+31,+504 29.42% *** 30.47% *** 49.41% *** 17.94% *** 
+31,+756 41.49% *** 45.92% *** 72.15% *** 26.75% *** 
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01 
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Table 2- 4      Returns to Repurchase Purpose  (continued)     
Cumulative Abnormal Market model returns (CARs) for both equal and 
value weighted portfolios of all firms Announcing Repurchase Plans to 
Counteract Dilution (n=126, beta = 1.27) 
 Market Model Scholes-Williams Market Model 
Window Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
-30, -2 -3.72% ** -4.33% ** -3.74% ** -4.27% ** 
-1,+1 1.82% ** 1.75% ** 1.75% ** 1.67% ** 
+2,+30 2.03%  1.68%  1.61%  1.20%  
+31,+504 -2.51% * 3.07%  -2.28% * 2.54%  
+31,+756 -0.62% * 6.16%  -0.60% * 6.63%  
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01 
  
Cumulative Abnormal Market model returns (CARs) for both equal and 
value weighted portfolios of all firms Announcing Repurchase Plans for 
purposes other than to fund a stock option plan, to fund an acquisition or to 
counteract dilution (n=3814, beta = 0.94) 
 Market Model Scholes-Williams Market Model 
Window Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
-30, -2 -5.36% *** -6.44% *** -5.42% *** -6.53% *** 
-1,+1 3.04% *** 2.94% *** 3.05% *** 2.92% *** 
+2,+30 1.75% *** 1.83% *** 1.86% *** 1.57% *** 
+31,+504 21.00% *** 22.40% *** 21.53% *** 19.63% *** 
+31,+756 31.77% *** 34.84% *** 32.56% *** 31.23% *** 
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01 
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Table 2-5 Free Cash Flow and Executive Ownership   
A.    The share ownership percentage is the number of shares held by the top executive 
(excluding stock options) divided by the number of common shares outstanding 
(ExecuComp variables SHROWN/SRSOUT). I have determined five levels of executive 
ownership; ZeroOwn (executive owns zero shares), Less1Own (less than one percent), 
1_5Own (between one and five percent), 5_25Own (between five and 25 percent), 
Great25Own (greater than 25 percent). 
Free cash flows are proxied with three calculations; operating income before depreciation 
divided by assets, net income before tax divided by assets, and net income available 
divided by assets. I placed the highest 30 percent of the free cash flow calculations in the 
high cash flow group, HCF; the next 40 percent of the free cash flow calculations in the 
medium group, MCF; and the lowest 30 percent of the free cash flows in the low free 
cash flow group, LCF. In some cases the three free cash flow proxies yielded a different 
classification. In such cases, the average classification was used. For example if one 
proxy calculation classified as high, another as medium and the final as low, the firm 
would be classified as MCF. 
Finally, 15 groups were form by taking members of each ownership group (5) and 
combining it with members of each free cash flow group (3). ANOVA follows for the 
group differences of the abnormal returns for five event time periods. Groups are sorted 
from lowest to highest average abnormal return. 
       
Group n (-30, -2) (-1, +1) (+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756)
HCF 1_5Own 63 -0.084 0.021 0.009 0.003 -0.052 
HCF 5_25OWN 13 -0.087 -0.005 0.100 -0.475 -0.442 
HCF Great25Own 6 -0.063 -0.048 0.008 0.106 0.336 
HCF Less1Own 207 -0.085 0.008 0.018 0.015 0.069 
HCF ZeroOwn 22 -0.068 0.023 0.021 0.568 0.645 
LCF 1_5Own 32 -0.132 0.000 0.012 0.271 0.357 
LCF 5_25OWN 14 -0.031 0.041 0.074 0.864 1.578 
LCF Great25Own 5 -0.116 0.106 -0.003 0.477 0.356 
LCF Less1Own 150 -0.048 0.017 0.035 0.206 0.453 
LCF ZeroOwn 13 -0.087 0.038 0.031 0.688 0.815 
MCF 1_5Own 70 -0.087 0.021 -0.001 0.082 0.112 
MCF 5_25OWN 37 -0.049 -0.005 0.007 0.055 0.174 
MCF 
Great25Own 12 -0.094 0.031 0.015 0.550 0.613 
MCF Less1Own 306 -0.044 0.016 0.013 0.016 0.031 
MCF ZeroOwn 31 -0.032 0.003 -0.020 0.046 0.138 
P-value   0.453 0.086 0.783 0.006 0.000 
Table 2-5    Free Cash Flow and Executive Ownership (Continued) 
B    Ownership is proxied with three calculations; executive shares owned divided by 
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common shares outstanding, the market value of the common shares held by executive 
divided by the executive’s salary and bonus, and the share ownership value plus the 
Black Scholes option value divided by the executives salary and bonus. The highest 30 
percent of the executive ownership level were placed in the high ownership, HOwn; the 
next 40 percent in the medium group, MOwn; and the lowest 30 percent in the low 
ownership group, LOwn. In cases where the three ownership proxies yielded a different 
classification, the average classification was used. 
Free cash flows are proxied by three calculations; operating income before depreciation 
divided by assets, net income before tax divided by assets, and net income available 
divided by assets. The highest 30 percent of the free cash flow calculations were placed 
in the high cash flow group, HCF; the next 40 percent in the medium group, MCF; and 
the lowest 30 percent in the low free cash flow group, LCF. In some cases the three free 
cash flow proxies yielded a different classification. In such cases, the average was used.  
Finally, nine groups were form by taking members of each ownership group (3) and 
combining it with members of each free cash flow group (3). ANOVA follows for the 
group differences of the abnormal returns for five event time periods noted. 
       
Panel A Groups  n   (-30, -2) (-1, +1) (+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756) 
HCF Hown 88 -0.077 0.006 0.020 0.108 0.218 
HCF Lown 89 -0.081 0.013 -0.001 -0.041 -0.022 
HCF Mown 134 -0.089 0.011 0.033 0.038 0.035 
LCF Hown 53 -0.084 0.010 0.029 0.453 0.663 
LCF Lown 80 -0.054 0.027 0.040 0.183 0.477 
LCF Mown 81 -0.059 0.018 0.028 0.292 0.482 
MCF Hown 138 -0.066 0.014 0.021 0.080 0.138 
MCF Lown 112 -0.053 0.002 0.014 0.018 0.043 
MCF Mown 206 -0.041 0.022 -0.005 0.038 0.056 
P-value 980 0.539 0.385 0.417 0.087 0.037 
       
Panel B Groups         (+31, +504) (+31, +756) 
HCF Lown 88    -0.041 -0.022 
LCF Mown 81    0.292 0.482 
P-value     0.037 0.016 
       
Panel C Groups         (+31, +504) (+31, +756) 
HCF Lown 88    -0.041 -0.022 
LCF Hown 53    0.453 0.663 
P-value         0.013 0.007 
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Table 2-6     Executive Options 
Executive option value is determined by the value of the exercisable stock option divided 
by the total salary and bonus (ExecuComp variables SOPTEXER/TCC). I have 
determined four option value levels They are no or zero value of exercisable options,  
NoOpt; low value of exercisable options, LOpt (value of exercisable options is less than 
20 percent of the executive’s salary and bonus); medium value of exercisable options, 
MOpt (value of exercisable options is between 20 and 150 percent of the executive’s 
salary and bonus); and a high option level, HOpt (value of exercisable options is greater 
than 150 percent of the executive’s salary and bonus). 
ANOVA follows for the group differences of the abnormal returns for five event time 
periods: 30 days to two days prior to the repurchase announcement (-30, -2), the event 
period (-1, +1), 30 days post-announcement (+2, +30), two-years post-announcement 
(+31, +504), and three-years post-announcement.  
       
Panel A Groups n (-30, -2)  (-1, +1)  (+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756)
Hopt 159 -0.070 0.024 0.008 0.132 0.215 
Lopt 79 -0.070 0.018 0.026 0.164 0.249 
Mopt 156 -0.044 0.006 0.035 0.183 0.308 
NOopt 583 -0.068 0.014 0.013 0.054 0.116 
P-value 976 0.579 0.191 0.409 0.436 0.358 
       
Panel B Groups n (-30, -2)  (-1, +1)  (+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756)
Hopt 159 -0.070 0.024 0.008 0.132 0.215 
Lopt 79 -0.070 0.018 0.026 0.164 0.249 
Mopt 156 -0.044 0.006 0.035 0.183 0.308 
P-value 393 0.491 0.063 0.388 0.896 0.804 
       
Panel C Groups n (-30, -2)  (-1, +1)  (+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756)
Hopt 159 -0.070 0.024 0.008 0.132 0.215 
Lopt&Mopt 235 -0.053 0.010 0.032 0.177 0.288 
P-value 393 0.424 0.046 0.187 0.656 0.571 
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Table 2- 7 Executive Ownership and Options 
The share ownership percentage is the number of shares held by the top executive 
(excluding stock options) divided by the number of common shares outstanding. Five 
levels of executive ownership are ZeroOwn (executive owns zero shares), Less1Own 
(less than one percent), 1_5Own (between one and five percent), 5_25Own (between five 
and 25 percent), Great25Own (greater than 25 percent). 
Executive option value is determined by the value of the exercisable stock option divided 
by the total salary and bonus. Four option value levels are no or zero value of exercisable 
options, NoOpt; low value of exercisable options, LOpt (value of exercisable options is 
less than 20 percent); medium value of exercisable options, MOpt (value of exercisable 
options is between 20 and 150 percent); and a high option level, HOpt (value of 
exercisable options is greater than 150 percent of the executive’s salary and bonus). 
Finally, 18 groups were form by taking members of each ownership group (5) and 
combining it with members of each option level group (4) (Two groups have no 
members.). ANOVA follows for the group differences of the abnormal returns for five 
event time periods: 30 days to two days prior to the repurchase announcement (-30, -2), 
the event period (-1, +1), 30 days post-announcement (+2, +30), two-years post-
announcement (+31, +504), and three-years post-announcement.  
       
Panel A Groups n (-30, -2)  (-1, +1)  (+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756) 
1_5Own HOpt 52 -0.084 0.013 0.046 0.167 0.294 
1_5Own LOpt 15 -0.124 0.052 -0.044 0.462 0.694 
1_5Own MOpt 34 -0.056 0.024 0.041 0.524 0.651 
1_5Own NOpt 122 -0.081 0.013 0.002 -0.099 -0.108 
5_25Own HOpt 10 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.363 0.653 
5_25Own LOpt 2 -0.065 -0.171 -0.083 -0.515 -0.583 
5_25Own MOpt 11 -0.061 -0.014 0.014 -0.548 -0.450 
5_25Own NOpt 60 -0.061 0.015 0.037 0.192 0.521 
Great25Own HOpt 2 -0.886 -0.004 0.179 1.509 1.586 
Great25Own LOpt 1 -0.112 0.066 0.059 1.148 0.863 
Great25Own NOpt 21 -0.074 0.029 -0.027 0.332 0.420 
Less 1Own HOpt 145 -0.062 0.021 0.006 0.101 0.218 
Less 1Own LOpt 93 -0.051 0.021 0.026 0.244 0.325 
Less 1Own MOpt 166 -0.034 0.008 0.016 0.139 0.299 
Less 1Own NOpt 513 -0.063 0.009 0.016 0.065 0.138 
ZeroOwn HOpt 4 -0.059 0.048 0.020 -0.001 0.138 
ZeroOwn MOpt 4 -0.133 -0.008 0.132 0.867 0.938 
ZeroOwn NOpt 81 -0.053 0.013 -0.013 0.393 0.564 
P-value 1335 0.000 0.156 0.559 0.003 0.006 
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Table 2-7    Executive Ownership and Option (Continued) 
Panel B Groups n (-30, -2)  (-1, +1)  (+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756) 
1_25Own/Hopt 62 -0.069 0.012 0.040 0.198 0.352 
1_25Own/MLopt 62 -0.074 0.018 0.012 0.287 0.441 
1_25Own/Nopt 182 -0.074 0.013 0.013 -0.004 0.097 
Great25 28 -0.115 0.023 0.005 0.412 0.473 
Less1/Hopt 150 -0.062 0.022 0.006 0.098 0.216 
Less1/MLopt 263 -0.042 0.012 0.021 0.187 0.318 
Less1/Nopt 594 -0.061 0.009 0.012 0.110 0.197 
P-value 1340 0.444 0.717 0.857 0.197 0.339 
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Table 2- 8      Type of Repurchase Abnormal Returns Pre-Event CAR  
Dutch-Auction Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 9 0.96 -0.45%  1.24%  -1.14%  0.47%  
1996 17 0.61 1.15%  -1.10%  0.77%  -0.94%  
1997 21 1.01 -4.38%  -1.69%  -5.81%  -2.73%  
1998 24 0.85 -5.07%  -5.89%  -4.67%  -5.76%  
1999 18 0.78 0.43%  1.16%  0.68%  1.15%  
2000 17 0.58 -2.12%  -0.40%  -0.98%  0.00%  
2001 9 1.05 -7.67%  1.35%  -9.39% * 0.38%  
2002 11 0.56 -1.66%  -2.87%  -1.35%  -2.43%  
1995-2002 126 0.84 -2.49% * -1.51% * -2.66% * -1.67% * 
           
Fixed Price Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 8 0.96 4.39%  6.00%  6.10%  5.83%  
1996 11 0.61 0.42%  1.67%  0.80%  1.69%  
1997 14 1.01 -2.86%  -2.23%  -2.74%  -2.11%  
1998 6 0.85 6.57%  -0.57%  4.34%  -1.21%  
1999 14 0.78 2.02%  3.77%  1.33%  3.18%  
2000 13 0.58 11.82%  9.36%  12.88% * 10.47%  
2001 9 1.05 20.43% ** 21.19% ** 19.83% ** 20.96% **
2002 16 0.56 0.91%  -0.26%  0.70%  0.16%  
1995-2002 91 0.84 4.61%   4.32%   4.63%   4.40%   
           
Open Market Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 493 0.96 -2.52% *** -2.75% *** -2.60% *** -6.06% ***
1996 691 0.61 -3.27% ** -4.30% *** -3.31% *** -4.33% ***
1997 664 1.01 -4.08% *** -5.24% *** -3.80% *** -5.85% ***
1998 647 0.85 -7.90% *** -12.44% *** -8.07% *** -12.32% ***
1999 415 0.78 -8.76% *** -7.54% *** -9.15% *** -7.92% ***
2000 320 0.58 -11.75% *** -13.88% *** -11.83% *** -13.52% ***
2001 177 1.05 -5.57% *** -6.17% *** -6.62% *** -6.08% ***
2002 399 0.56 -4.48% *** -6.99% *** -4.83% *** -6.76% ***
1995-2002 3806 0.84 -5.65% *** -7.17% *** -5.78% *** -7.29% ***
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Table 2- 8      Type of Repurchase  (continued) At Announcement CARs (-1,+1) 
Dutch-Auction Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 9 0.96 4.41% *** 4.55% *** 4.37% * 4.38% * 
1996 17 0.61 9.32% *** 9.12% *** 9.32% *** 9.14% ***
1997 21 1.01 9.66% ** 10.06% *** 9.63% *** 10.14% ***
1998 24 0.85 8.24% *** 8.17% *** 8.36% *** 8.25% ***
1999 18 0.78 7.93% *** 7.91% *** 7.91% *** 7.78% **
2000 17 0.58 12.96% *** 12.79% *** 12.91% *** 12.81% ***
2001 9 1.05 9.50% ** 9.80% ** 9.53% *** 9.85% ***
2002 11 0.56 13.28% *** 13.23% *** 13.12% *** 13.00% ***
1995-2002 126 0.84 9.47% *** 9.50% *** 9.46% *** 9.49% ***
           
Fixed Price Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 8 0.96 19.54% *** 19.67% *** 19.52% *** 19.55% ***
1996 11 0.61 2.91%  2.93%  2.86%  2.85%  
1997 14 1.01 4.16% ** 4.13% ** 4.11% ** 4.09% **
1998 6 0.85 5.18% *** 4.66% ** 5.22% *** 4.75% **
1999 14 0.78 12.70% *** 13.08% *** 12.65% *** 13.13% ***
2000 13 0.58 11.08% *** 10.67% *** 11.21% *** 11.18% ***
2001 9 1.05 10.97% *** 10.35% *** 11.39% *** .1079* ***
2002 16 0.56 7.93% *** 7.59% *** 7.77% *** 7.53% ***
1995-2002 91 0.84 9.07% *** 8.92% *** 9.08% *** 9.01% ***
           
Open Market Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 493 0.96 2.48% *** 2.47% *** 2.48% *** 2.45% ***
1996 691 0.61 2.41% *** 2.35% *** 2.44% *** 2.33% ***
1997 664 1.01 2.34% *** 2.24% *** 2.36% *** 2.03% ***
1998 647 0.85 3.45% *** 3.23% *** 3.54% *** 3.24% ***
1999 415 0.78 3.57% *** 3.72% *** 3.59% *** 3.75% ***
2000 320 0.58 4.20% *** 3.91% *** 4.24% *** 4.01% ***
2001 177 1.05 4.86% *** 3.74% *** 4.54% *** 3.95% ***
2002 399 0.56 3.29% *** 3.05% *** 3.31% *** 3.07% ***
1995-2002 3806 0.84 3.07% *** 2.91% *** 3.08% *** 2.90% ***
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Table 2- 8      Type of Repurchase (continued) Short-term (+2,+30) CARs 
Dutch-Auction Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 9 0.96 0.00%  0.94%  -0.17%  0.27%  
1996 17 0.61 1.07%  0.13%  1.14%  -0.11%  
1997 21 1.01 -5.83% * -3.10%  -7.42%  -4.71%  
1998 24 0.85 3.01%  2.37%  3.95%  2.75%  
1999 18 0.78 -4.71%  -0.45%  -3.96%  -0.46%  
2000 17 0.58 13.47% * 10.55% * 12.36% * 10.04%  
2001 9 1.05 4.36%  4.73%  4.44%  5.05%  
2002 11 0.56 2.91%  2.47%  2.91%  2.82%  
1995-2002 126 0.84 1.53%   1.93%   1.33%   1.64%   
           
Fixed Price Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 8 0.96 -7.04%  -5.82%  -6.64%  -6.40%  
1996 11 0.61 2.35%  0.90%  0.56%  -0.55%  
1997 14 1.01 4.55%  6.58%  4.58%  6.44%  
1998 6 0.85 -18.28% * -21.51% ** -20.68% ** -23.41% ***
1999 14 0.78 -3.74%  -1.98%  -5.04%  -2.18%  
2000 13 0.58 -4.26%  -1.67%  -3.66%  -2.24%  
2001 9 1.05 -0.15%  0.34%  -1.25%  -0.58%  
2002 16 0.56 -0.39%  -0.87%  -0.14%  -0.68%  
1995-2002 91 0.84 -2.24%   -1.47%   -2.62%   -2.01%   
           
Open Market Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 493 0.96 0.17%  0.49%  0.14%  0.11%  
1996 691 0.61 0.89% *** 2.35% *** 0.85% *** 0.55% * 
1997 664 1.01 0.68%  0.61%  0.83%  -0.53%  
1998 645 0.85 3.59% *** 1.73%  3.78% *** 1.73%  
1999 415 0.78 2.18%  4.89% *** 2.10%  4.34% ***
2000 320 0.58 2.93% *** 1.73% ** 3.05% *** 2.11% **
2001 177 1.05 5.24% * 6.47% ** 5.81% * 6.40% **
2002 399 0.56 1.93%  1.69%  1.96%  1.62%  
1995-2002 3804 0.84 1.84% *** 1.73% *** 1.92% *** 1.43% ***
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Table 2- 8      Type of Repurchase (continued) Two-year post CARs 
Dutch-Auction Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 9 0.96 15.16%  9.84%  10.57%  2.50%  
1996 17 0.61 29.08% * 2.99%  24.87% * 1.33%  
1997 21 1.01 -25.93% ** -17.44% ** -44.54% ** -33.91% ***
1998 24 0.85 -3.08%  11.60%  -2.47%  10.84%  
1999 18 0.78 21.38% * 52.79% *** 22.70% * 56.29% ***
2000 17 0.58 98.74% *** 86.99% *** 94.99% *** 85.17% ***
2001 9 1.05 -60.34% ** -25.52% * -66.22% ** -32.68% **
2002 11 0.56 -15.43%  -7.76%  -9.11%  -5.06%  
1995-2002 126 0.84 10.73% * 16.90% * 6.62%   13.19% * 
           
Fixed Price Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 8 0.96 -0.27%  -3.44%  -4.96%  -10.29%  
1996 11 0.61 47.80% *** 38.55% *** 45.09% *** 38.73% ***
1997 14 1.01 30.24%  24.42%  28.38%  24.11%  
1998 6 0.85 22.99%  16.63%  25.85%  18.58%  
1999 14 0.78 9.60%  28.14% * 11.82%  33.77% **
2000 13 0.58 61.40% *** 52.45% *** 62.76% *** 59.80% ***
2001 9 1.05 16.55%  19.33%  19.69%  21.34%  
2002 16 0.56 -3.15%  8.45%  -7.07%  2.39%  
1995-2002 91 0.84 23.33% *** 24.39% *** 22.63% *** 24.89% ***
           
Open Market Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 493 0.96 20.32% *** 16.15% *** 19.59% *** 12.45% ***
1996 691 0.61 25.58% *** 1.99% *** 24.87% *** 1.52% ***
1997 664 1.01 -5.58% *** -14.52% *** -2.21% *** -30.87% ***
1998 643 0.85 0.04% *** 24.41% *** 1.01% *** 22.15% ***
1999 415 0.78 41.18% *** 66.57% *** 37.95% *** 64.43% ***
2000 320 0.58 44.47% *** 26.75% *** 43.60% *** 33.09% ***
2001 177 1.05 -22.96% *** -8.44% *** -19.77% *** -9.82% ***
2002 399 0.56 -14.28% *** 0.56% *** -12.45% *** -2.07% ***
1995-2002 3802 0.84 11.99% *** 13.23% *** 12.43% *** 9.37% ***
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Table 2- 8      Type of Repurchase (continued) Three-year CARs 
Dutch-Auction Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 9 0.96 17.32%  6.43%  11.92%  -4.68%  
1996 17 0.61 12.60%  -21.98%  6.91%  -24.31% * 
1997 21 1.01 -37.61% *** -16.66% *** -62.20% *** -38.12% ***
1998 24 0.85 26.53% * 49.05% *** 28.88% ** 50.48% ***
1999 18 0.78 44.61% ** 93.86% *** 45.23% ** 98.89% ***
2000 17 0.58 138.77% *** 118.89% *** 132.27% *** 116.48% **
2001 9 1.05 -79.17% *** -0.30% * -86.24% *** -40.78% **
2002 11 0.56 -15.43%  -7.76%  -9.11%  -5.06%  
1995-2002 126 0.84 19.62% ** 30.21% *** 14.02% ** 25.55% ***
           
Fixed Price Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 8 0.96 17.51%  6.95%  4.94%  -7.22%  
1996 11 0.61 45.69% *** 32.70% ** 38.89% *** 30.09% **
1997 14 1.01 17.03%  12.01%  13.35%  12.12%  
1998 6 0.85 22.90%  12.67%  23.69%  11.26%  
1999 14 0.78 24.95% ** 46.25% *** 29.64% ** 57.40% ***
2000 13 0.58 69.43% *** 61.28% *** 68.63% *** 67.59% ***
2001 9 1.05 28.34%  34.83%  34.57%  39.13%  
2002 16 0.56 -3.15%  8.45%  -7.07%  2.39%  
1995-2002 91 0.84 27.34% *** 28.02% *** 25.50% *** 28.34% ***
           
Open Market Market Model Scholes-Williams  
Year n B Equal Wt  Value Wt  Equal Wt  Value Wt  
1995 493 0.96 38.74% *** 21.92% *** 38.21% *** 16.59% ***
1996 691 0.61 25.11% *** -9.15% *** 23.92% *** -9.76% ***
1997 664 1.01 -13.98% *** 14.58% *** -8.48% *** -38.89% ***
1998 643 0.85 19.00% *** 52.11% *** 19.47% *** 53.07% ***
1999 415 0.78 65.06% *** 103.45% *** 58.69% *** 99.39% ***
2000 320 0.58 46.14% *** 26.00% *** 45.69% *** 33.63% ***
2001 177 1.05 -36.28% *** -12.74% *** -30.28% *** -0.15% ***
2002 399 0.56 -14.28% *** 0.56% *** -12.45% *** -2.07% ***
1995-2002 3802 0.84 18.16% *** 20.39% *** 18.64% *** 15.28% ***
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Table 2-9 Market Reaction to Repurchase Announcements       
Models 1 through 6 include 913 firms that announce open-market repurchases from 1995 to 2002. 
Returnit = b0 + b1Xit + b2Year Indicators + eit. (t-statistics in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote 
significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% levels). 
A.    Return for (-30, -2)  Panel A is 1 of 2     
Variable (1)   (3)   (5)   (6)     
Intercept -0.07482  -0.04384 * -0.05735 *** -0.04381 *   
 (-.81)  (-1.75)  (6.67)  (-1.69)    
PrcBk-1  -0.00007  0.00014    0.00014    
 (-0.71)  (0.42)    (0.43)    
EpsDil-1  0.03759          
 (0.41)          
NI/assets -0.04718          
 (-0.63)          
Share% -0.07526 **         
 (-2.14)          
StkVal -0.00128          
 (-0.08)          
IncGrow  -0.00032  -0.00057 **   -0.00057 **   
 (-1.66) * (-2.25)    (-2.24)    
EpsGrow    0.00000    0.00000    
   (0.25)    (0.32)    
MktVal 0.00034          
 (0.97)          
BlkVal  0.00039          
 (0.66)          
Soptexer    0.00051    0.00050    
   (0.68)    (0.66)    
DumACQ 0.00598  0.00667  0.02134  0.01139    
 (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.30)  (0.18)    
DumDIL 0.01781  0.01478  0.01877  0.01712    
 (0.63)  (0.48)  (0.67)  (0.56)    
DumEBP 0.00539  -0.00762  -0.00630  -0.00664    
 (0.21)  (-0.26)  (-0.22)  (-0.22)    
DumESV -0.02367  -0.00148  -0.02299  -0.00185    
 (-1.22)  (-0.07)  (-1.26)  (-0.09)    
DumSTP 0.04380 ** 0.04167 ** 0.03036  0.04277 **   
 (2.13)  (2.04)  (1.53)  (2.07)    
DumUVL -0.08009 *** -0.11400 *** -0.08829 *** -0.11392 ***   
 (-3.11)  (-4.21)  (-3.43)  (-4.19)    
Freq       -0.01310    
       (-0.69)    
Somefreq       0.00623    
       (0.37)    
Year  Yes  Yes  No  Yes    
Adj. R2 0.0365   0.0517   0.0121   0.0494       
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Table 2-9 (Continued)             
Models 7 and 8  include 963 firms that announce open-market, 
Dutch-auction or fixed-price repurchases from 1995 to 2002.  
A.    Return for (-30, -2) Panel A is 2 of 2. 
Variable (2)   (4)   (7)   (8)   
Intercept -0.00872  -0.06282 ***     
 (-0.07)  (-2.76)      
PrcBk_0  -0.00059  -0.00017      
 (-0.71)  (-0.52)      
EpsDil_0  0.04454        
 (0.36)        
Share% -0.07525 **       
 (-2.04)        
IncGrow  -0.00049 **       
 (-2.27)        
EpsGrow    0.00000      
   (0.38)      
MktVal   0.00028      
   (0.81)      
Soptexer  -0.00004  0.00052      
 (-0.03)  (0.67)      
DumACQ 0.00855        
 (0.12)        
DumDIL 0.01317        
 (0.43)        
DumEBP -0.00437        
 (-0.15)        
DumESV -0.03493        
 (-1.60)        
DumSTP 0.04245 **       
 (1.97)        
DumUVL -0.08121 ***       
 (-2.87)        
Year  Yes  Yes      
Adj. R2 0.0422   0.0144           
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Table 2-9 (continued) 
B.    Return for (-1 +1) Panel B is 1 of 2 
Variable (1)   (3)   (5)   (6)   
Intercept -0.03232  0.00069  0.01572 *** -0.00184  
 (-0.83)  (0.06)  (4.50)  (-0.16)  
PrcBk-1  -0.00001  -0.00019    -0.00019  
 (-0.18)  (-1.33)    (-1.34)  
EpsDil-1  0.03675        
 (0.95)        
NI/assets -0.00686        
 (-0.22)        
Share% -0.01687        
 (-1.14)        
StkVal 0.00135 *       
 (1.90)        
IncGrow  -0.00009  -0.00007    -0.00006  
 (-1.13)  (-0.61)    (-0.52)  
EpsGrow    0.00001 **   0.00001 **
         
MktVal -0.00008        
 (-0.56)        
BlkVal  0.00004        
 (0.15)        
Soptexer    0.00048    0.00049  
   (1.45)    (1.07)  
DumACQ -0.01342  0.01246  0.00938  0.00908  
 (0.47)  (0.45)  (0.32)  (0.33)  
DumDIL -0.01188  -0.02039  -0.00829  -0.02241 *
 (-0.99)  (-1.52)  (-0.73)  (-1.65)  
DumEBP -0.00812  -0.01216  -0.00449  -0.01263  
 (-0.66)  (-0.93)  (-0.39)  (-0.96)  
DumESV 0.01024 * 0.00831  0.00718  0.00772  
 (1.25)  (0.89)  (0.97)  (0.82)  
DumSTP -0.00019  -0.01008  -0.00389  -0.01136  
 (-0.02)  (-1.12)  (-0.48)  (-1.25)  
DumUVL 0.00239  -0.00985  0.00015  -0.01064  
 (0.22)  (-0.82)  (0.01)  (-0.89)  
Freq       0.00641  
       (0.76)  
Somefreq       0.00244  
       (0.33)  
Year  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  
Adj. R2 -0.0062   0.0062   -0.0041   0.0052   
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Table 2-9 (continued) 
B.    Return for (-1 +1) Panel B is 2 of 2. 
Variable (2)   (4)  (7)   (8)   
Intercept -0.00352  0.00384  0.00596  0.01180  
 (-.007)  (0.39)  (0.53)  (1.29)  
PrcBk_0  0.00004  -0.00019      
 (0.13)  (-1.34)      
EpsDil_0  0.00529        
 (0.11)        
Share% -0.01509        
 (-1.01)        
IncGrow  -0.00012    -0.00012    
 (-1.33)    (-1.08)    
EpsGrow    0.00001 ** 0.00000    
         
MktVal   -0.00004      
   (-0.30)      
Soptexer  0.00001 * 0.00049  0.00039    
 (1.69)  (1.46)  (1.16)    
DumACQ 0.01274    0.00983  0.01381  
 (0.44)    (0.35)  (0.47)  
DumDIL -0.01956    -0.01793  -0.00754 * 
 (-1.60)    (-1.30)  (-0.65)  
DumEBP -0.00823    -0.01211  -0.00395  
 (-0.64)    (-0.91)  (-0.34)  
DumESV 0.01963 **   0.00512  0.00745  
 (2.22)    (0.56)  (0.97)  
DumSTP -0.00182    -0.00960  -0.00324  
 (-0.21)    (-1.05)  (-0.39)  
DumUVL 0.00026    -0.00405  0.00470  
 (0.02)    (-0.34)  (0.44)  
Freq     0.01    
     (0.77)    
Somefreq     0.00    
     (0.06)    
DA     0.07 *** 0.06122 ***
     (5.11)  (4.69)  
FP     -0.02  -0.01425  
     (-0.68)  (-0.48)  
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2 0.0002   0.0052  0.0390   0.0139   
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Table 2-9 (continued) 
C.    Return for (+2 +30) Panel C is 1 of 2 
Variable (1)   (3)   (5)  (6)   
Intercept -0.05920  0.00274  0.01746 ** 0.01165  
 (-0.77)  (0.14)  (2.44)  (0.56)  
PrcBk-1  -0.00004  -0.00089 ***   -0.00088  
 (-0.49)  (-3.45)    (-3.44) ***
EpsDil-1  0.05954        
 (0.78)        
NI/assets 0.06832        
 (1.11)        
Share% 0.00731        
 (0.25)        
StkVal 0.00247 *       
 (1.77)        
IncGrow  -0.00019  0.00041 **   0.00037 * 
 (-1.20)  (2.01)    (1.82)  
EpsGrow    0.00000    0.00001  
   (0.57)    (0.97)  
MktVal 0.00058        
 (0.20)        
BlkVal  -0.00007        
 (-0.15)        
Soptexer    -0.00053    -0.00063  
   (-0.96)    (-1.04)  
DumACQ 0.00179  0.01022  0.00542  0.02843  
 (0.03)  (0.20)  (0.09)  (0.57)  
DumDIL -0.01649  -0.00534  -0.02721  0.00491  
 (-0.70)  (-0.22)  (-1.16)  (0.20)  
DumEBP -0.02076  -0.01848  -0.01060  -0.01550  
 (-0.87)  (-0.77)  (-0.44)  (-0.65)  
DumESV -0.00223  0.00829  0.00542  0.00986  
 (-0.14)  (0.49)  (0.36)  (0.58)  
DumSTP 0.01879  0.00397  0.02073  0.00996  
 (1.11)  (0.24)  (1.26)  (0.61)  
DumUVL 0.01361  0.02833  0.01873  0.03119  
 (0.64)  (1.30)  (0.87)  (1.44)  
Freq       -0.04007 ***
       (-2.64)  
Somefreq       -0.00017  
       (-0.01)  
Year  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  
Adj. R2 -0.0009   0.0452   -0.0021  0.0572   
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Table 2-9 (continued) 
C.    Return for (+2 +30) Panel C is 2 of 2. 
Variable (2)   (4)   (7)   (8)   
Intercept -0.01616  0.00549  -0.00635  0.00638  
 (-0.16)  (0.31)  (-0.16)  (0.23)  
PrcBk_0  0.00058  -0.00078 ***     
 (0.85)  (-3.07)      
EpsDil_0  -0.01730        
 (-0.17)        
Share% 0.00372        
 (0.12)        
IncGrow  -0.00007    0.00026    
 (-0.39)    (0.68)    
EpsGrow    0.00000  0.00000    
   (0.54)  (0.28)    
MktVal   0.00018      
   (0.67)      
Soptexer  0.00103 *** -0.00055  0.00039    
 (0.91)  (-0.90)  (-0.33)    
DumACQ 0.00401    -0.00125  -0.00343  
 (0.07)    (-0.01)  (-0.04)  
DumDIL -0.01632    -0.00955  -0.02943  
 (-0.65)    (-0.20)  (-0.82)  
DumEBP -0.01894    -0.04501  -0.02623  
 (-0.73)    (-0.98)  (-0.72)  
DumESV 0.00220    -0.03871  -0.01688  
 (0.12)    (-1.22)  (-0.72)  
DumSTP 0.00817    -0.01210  0.01125  
 (0.46)    (-0.38)  (0.45)  
DumUVL 0.00529    0.00080  0.00735  
 (0.23)    (0.02)  (0.23)  
Freq     0.00173    
     (0.06)    
Somefreq     0.02599    
     (1.03)    
DA     0.20396 *** 0.18427 ***
     (4.53)  (4.59)  
FP     0.17624 * 0.17596 * 
     (1.79)  (1.94)  
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2 -0.0016   0.0419   0.0376   0.0220   
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Table 2-9 (continued) 
D.    Return for (+30 Two years) Panel D is 1 of 2 
Variable (1)   (3)   (5)   (6)   
Intercept -0.13381  -0.01625  0.12715 *** -0.01137  
 (-0.74)  (-0.12)  (2.97)  (-0.08)  
PrcBk-1  0.00051  0.00190    0.00189  
 (1.10)  (1.15)    (1.15)  
EpsDil-1  0.41952        
 (0.93)        
NI/assets -0.62612 *       
 (-1.71)        
Share% 0.35803 **       
 (2.08)        
StkVal 0.01030        
 (1.25)        
IncGrow  -0.00409 *** -0.00668 ***   -0.00669 ***
 (-4.34)  (-5.25)    (-5.23)  
EpsGrow    0.00002    0.00002  
   (0.42)    (0.42)  
MktVal -0.00123        
 (-0.72)        
BlkVal  -0.00115        
 (-0.40)        
Soptexer    -0.00353    -0.00353  
   (-0.93)    (-0.93)  
DumACQ -0.20677  -0.26211  -0.24351  -0.26028  
 (-0.62)  (-0.84)  (-0.69)  (-0.82)  
DumDIL -0.14856  -0.25748  -0.28589 ** -0.25591 * 
 (-1.07)  (-1.68)  (-2.05)  (-1.66)  
DumEBP -0.04357  0.04580  0.09425  0.04574  
 (-0.31)  (0.31)  (0.66)  (0.31)  
DumESV -0.09432  -0.01325  -0.14440  -0.01168  
 (-0.99)  (-0.12)  (-1.58)  (-0.11)  
DumSTP 0.24495 ** 0.25132 *** 0.22910 ** 0.25270 **
 (2.57)  (2.45)  (2.33)  (2.44)  
DumUVL -0.08316  -0.06036  -0.13960  -0.05890  
 (-0.66)  (-0.44)  (-1.09)  (-0.43)  
Freq       0.00067  
       (0.01)  
Somefreq       -0.01090  
       (-0.13)  
Year  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  
Adj. R2 0.0816   0.1253   0.0097   0.1224   
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Table 2-9 (continued) 
D.    Return for (+30 Two years) Panel D is 2 of 2. 
Variable (2)   (4)  (7)   (8)  
        
Intercept -0.50772  -0.09659 -0.02546  -0.01469
 (-0.82)  (-0.81) (-0.19)  (-0.13) 
PrcBk_0  0.00202  0.00088    
 (0.50)  (0.53)    
EpsDil_0  0.60061      
 (1.01)      
Share% 0.34833 *     
 (1.95)      
IncGrow  -0.00456 ***  -0.00613 ***  
 (-4.33)   (-4.82)   
EpsGrow    0.00002 0.00002   
   (0.46) (0.63)   
MktVal   -0.00057    
   (-0.33)    
Soptexer  0.00232  -0.00316 -0.00390   
 (0.35)  (-0.81) (-1.01)   
DumACQ -0.23201   -0.26787  -0.22517
 (-0.67)   (-0.83)  (-0.65) 
DumDIL -0.29160 **  -0.28226 * -0.26150 *
 (-1.99)   (-1.81)  (-1.91) 
DumEBP -0.04190   0.02893  0.04388 
 (-0.27)   (0.19)  (0.32) 
DumESV 0.11796   -0.04740  -0.09898
 (-1.11)   (-0.46)  (-1.09) 
DumSTP 0.20114 *  0.22129 ** 0.16910 *
 (1.93)   (2.13)  (1.75) 
DumUVL -0.06279   -0.06986  -0.19176
 (-0.46)   (-0.51)  (-1.53) 
Freq    0.00320   
    (0.03)   
Somefreq    0.03316   
    (0.40)   
DA    0.12428  0.16774 
    (0.84)  (1.08) 
FP    -0.04013  0.10648 
    (-0.12)  (0.31) 
Year  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2 0.0754   0.0842  0.1212   0.0534  
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Table 2-9 (continued) 
E.    Return for (+30 Three years) Panel E is 1 of 2 
Variable (1)   (3)   (5)   (6)   
Intercept -0.84043  0.05133  0.20817 *** 0.08689  
 (-1.47)  (0.30)  (3.78)  (0.50)  
PrcBk-1  0.00004  0.00455 **   0.00452 **
 (0.06)  (2.17)    (2.15)  
EpsDil-1  0.99994 *       
 (1.76)        
NI/assets -0.81467 *       
 (-1.77)        
Share% 0.39822 *       
 (1.84)        
StkVal 0.00361        
 (0.35)        
IncGrow  -0.00490 *** -0.00455 **   -0.00460 **
 (-4.13)  (-2.39)    (-2.42)  
EpsGrow    -0.00539 ***   -0.00550 ***
   (-3.63)    (-3.69)  
MktVal -0.00244        
 (-1.13)        
BlkVal  0.00059        
 (0.16)        
Soptexer    -0.00632    -0.00638  
   (-1.30)    (-1.32)  
DumACQ -0.44883 *** -0.54254  -0.54550  -0.53149  
 (-1.07)  (-1.36)  (-1.20)  (-1.32)  
DumDIL -0.24654 ** -0.38236 * -0.38534 ** -0.32085  
 (-1.40)  (-1.71)  (-2.16)  (-1.63)  
DumEBP 0.07503  0.10720  0.27925  0.10691  
 (0.42)  (0.56)  (1.53)  (0.56)  
DumESV -0.12850  -0.07849  -0.19422 * -0.06694  
 (-1.07)  (-0.58)  (-1.66)  (-0.49)  
DumSTP 0.34207 *** 0.27753 ** 0.33184 *** 0.28678 **
 (2.70)  (2.13)  (2.64)  (2.18)  
DumUVL -0.06817  -0.06211  -0.11837  -0.05082  
 (-0.43)  (-0.36)  (-0.72)  (-0.29)  
Freq       0.00949  
       (0.08)  
Somefreq       -0.08198  
       (-0.75)  
Year  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  
Adj. R2 0.07560   0.12420   0.01560   0.12240   
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Table 2-9 (continued) 
E.    Return for (+30 Three years)  Panel E is 2 of 2. 
Variable (2)   (4)   (7)   (8)  
Intercept -0.89011  0.00417  0.09190  0.00902  
 (-1.13)  (0.03)  (0.53)  (0.06)  
PrcBk_0  -0.00027 *** 0.00430 **     
 (-0.05)  (2.06)      
EpsDil_0  1.03764        
 (1.36)        
Share% 0.41224 *       
 (1.80)        
IncGrow  -0.00568 ***   -0.00432 **   
 (-4.24)    (-2.31)    
EpsGrow    -0.00720 *** -0.00438 ***   
   (-5.69)  (-3.21)    
MktVal   -0.00152      
   (-0.71)      
Soptexer  -0.00558  -0.00636  -0.07150    
 (-0.66)  (-1.31)  (-1.47)    
DumACQ -0.49438    -0.50009  -0.48365  
 (-1.12)    (-1.23)  (-1.10)  
DumDIL -0.40336 **   -0.37268 * -0.37950 **
 (-2.16)    (-1.88)  (-2.183)  
DumEBP 0.08885    0.09630  0.19319  
 (0.46)    (0.51)  (1.09)  
DumESV -0.15604    -0.08623  -0.13244  
 (-1.15)    (-0.64)  (-1.14)  
DumSTP 0.28975 **   0.27379 ** 0.25864 **
 (2.18)    (2.09)  (2.11)  
DumUVL -0.04656    -0.05351  -0.20479  
 (-0.27)    (-0.31)  (-1.29)  
Freq     -0.04723    
     (-0.40)    
Somefreq     -0.02409    
     (-0.23)    
DA     -0.03018  -0.00015  
     (-0.14)  (0.00)  
FP     -0.14752  0.01255  
     (-0.29)  (0.02)  
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2 0.06820   0.11180   0.10570   0.04820  
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Chapter 3 
Why do firms repurchase stock to acquire another firm? 
 
In chapter 2, I suggest that using a repurchase to fund an acquisition may be an 
opportunistic motivation. This categorization was based on the hubris hypothesis of why 
we continue to see poor stock returns associated with mergers.45 This chapter investigates 
the enigmatic decision by a firm to take on the extra transactional step to repurchase its 
shares with cash and then use those shares to finance an acquisition, rather than use the 
cash to directly finance the acquisition. It would seem to be far easier, if a firm has the 
cash available, to acquire the target firm with the cash. This is even more of an enigma 
when it is well known that cash offerings perform better than stock offerings.46 
I find that firms that repurchase shares to finance an acquisition are well 
compensated for their efforts, The most compelling argument as to why firms would take 
on the extra financing step is to achieve the best of both the stock-financing acquisitions 
and cash-financing acquisitions. These firms experience risk sharing with the target 
firms, counteract the negative effects of dilution by repurchasing shares first, and enjoy a 
tax advantage for their efforts. 
                                                 
45 Roll, 1986, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers 
46 Martin, 1986, The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions, Investment Opportunities, and 
Management Ownership. 
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The organization of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first part discusses 
merger and acquisition literature. The second section develops the hypotheses and 
methodology. The third section reports the empirical findings and the last section 
summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
 
Literature 
 
Takeovers can occur through mergers, tender offers, or proxy contests. This 
research focuses on mergers, which are generally stock-financed, and tender offers, 
which are generally cash-financed. Mergers are negotiated directly with the target 
managers and require approval from the target firm’s board of directors. Tender offers are 
offers to buy shares made directly to target shareholders, bypassing the target managers. 
This research will also investigate the method of payment choice. Specifically, the 
research asks why firms would choose to repurchase their shares with cash and then use 
those shares to finance an acquisition, rather than use cash to finance the acquisition 
directly.  
Several hypotheses have been put forth to help explain the market’s behavior 
toward mergers and acquisitions. Myers and Majluf (1984), in their seminal paper that 
develops pecking order, address the benefits of financial slack. Convention assumes 
managers should accept all positive net present value (NPV) projects. However, if a firm 
can only issue risky debt, the firm may rationally pass up on positive NPV projects. 
Having financial slack enables the firm to take all positive NPV projects. Thus, firms 
with financial slack will issue stock only when their stock is overvalued. As a result, the 
   
 81
equity offering may send a signal that managers believe that their stock is overvalued. 
Thus, consistent with the Cash Availability Hypothesis, firms with financial slack will 
prefer to finance an acquisition with cash if their stock is undervalued. 
In a similar vein to the Cash Availability Hypothesis, the Investment 
Opportunities Hypothesis argues that managers with growth opportunities will prefer to 
raise capital with equity because it allows more flexibility in the use of funds than debt 
financing.47 Martin (1996) tests this hypothesis with three proxies for investment 
opportunity (Tobin’s q, five-years sales growth and the recent run-up of the firm’s stock 
price) and finds that both acquiring firms with high growth opportunity and the firms 
with recent stock price run-ups are more likely to use stock.  
The Control Hypothesis argues that firms with large managerial ownership 
positions should prefer to use cash to finance an acquisition because the alternative would 
dilute the managers’ control position.48 Martin (1996) suggests that managerial 
ownership may be nonlinear on the choice of stock financing. At very low and high 
ownership levels managers may not be very concerned about the impact of dilution of 
control. However, the middle range may be very concerned. Martin uses a spline variable 
approach to define the ownership levels. Low ownership groups have less than five 
percent manager and director combined ownership; the middle range is defined as greater 
than five percent and less than 25 percent and the high owner firms have greater than 25 
percent manager and director control. Martin’s sample of 721 firms found 425 in the low 
                                                 
47 Myers (1977) ties existence of growth opportunities to debt.  Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jung, Kim, 
and Stulz (1995) put forth this hypothesis. 
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group, 299 in the middle range and 125 in the high ownership group.49 Martin found that 
the low ownership group was not significant and he suggests that managers with low 
ownership were not concerned with dilution effects. Martin found that the middle range 
considered ownership important (significantly negative relationships in three of his four 
logistic regressions which suggest that the firm is not likely to use stock financing). 
Finally, Martin found the high ownership group to be significantly negative in one of four 
regressions, substantiating his nonlinear choice of stock financing.  
Martin (1996) uses the Risk Sharing Hypothesis to suggest that as target firms’ 
size increase (as measured by market value) and the addition of target firms to bidder 
firms becomes more significant, the bidder will prefer to use stock in order to share the 
risk with the target. On the other hand, if the acquiring firm’s size is significantly larger 
than the target firm, the acquirer will be less likely to feel the need to share risk since the 
target will not have as much an impact to the combined firm. In this case, the bidder will 
be less likely to use stock. Hansen (1987) models the payment choice under the condition 
of asymmetric information. If the target knows its value better than the bidder, the bidder 
will prefer stock in order to force the target to share in the post-acquisition reevaluation 
effects. Martin’s initial investigation finds no support. Martin refines his test by 
establishing four distant groups of firms; both the bidder and target firms have high 
Tobin’s q ratios (q>1), both firms have low q ratios (q<1), and groups of one firm high q 
and one firm low q. Martin finds that 68 percent of firms choose stock financing and only 
                                                                                                                                                 
48 Stulz (1988) and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1995) suggest that managers will not want issue stock if in doing 
so will dilute their control position. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) find evidence to support the control 
hypothesis. 
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16 percent choose cash if both the bidder and target have high investment opportunities. 
Furthermore, if both the parties have low investment opportunities, then only 26 percent 
use stock financing and 42 percent use cash financing50.  
The Outside Monitoring Hypothesis is suggested by Jensen (1991) and Black 
(1992). They argue that active investors and institutional shareholders undertake costly 
monitoring and thus can take actions to align managers’ interests with those of the 
shareholders. Martin (1996) finds support in that the presence of blockholders and 
institutional holders results in a higher likelihood of stock financing. 
Another argument supporting stock-financed acquisitions was put forth by 
Aboody, Kasznik and Williams (2000). They suggest that managers of acquiring firms 
should prefer pooling versus purchasing accounting because purchase accounting 
requires the firm to book as an asset the difference between the purchase price of the 
acquisition and the book value of the target firm. This asset is expensed into the future. 
This additional expense dampens net income and earning per share for years to come. As 
an aside, the authors did not address the positive tax consequences of these future 
expenses, but instead focused attention on the negative impacts of the publicly reported 
earnings.51 Aboody, Kasznik, and Williams suggest that because managerial incentive 
contracts are often tied to net income and earnings per share, managers should prefer 
pooling accounting. However, pooling accounting cannot be accomplished in conjunction 
                                                                                                                                                 
49 This cutoff choice is consistent with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). Furthermore Martin (1995) 
performed robustness checks on percentage changes with the groups and found little difference. 
50 Martin’s findings are in a total sample in which 40 percent of firms use stock financing and 35 percent 
cash. 
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with an acquiring firm repurchasing its shares. APBO No. 16 prohibits changes in equity 
interests of voting stock with pooling accounting.52 Therefore, firms cannot repurchase 
shares and then use those shares to pool assets with a target firm. The authors conclude 
that although managers should prefer pooling assets in stock for stock acquisitions, the 
transaction cannot be supported with the acquiring firm’s repurchase of its own shares. 
Aboody, Kasznik and Williams (2000) also argue that managers should prefer 
pooling. However, this might be shortsighted by the managers. Goodwill is created when 
a firm purchases another firm (or assets of another firm) for greater than its market value. 
The difference between the fair market value and the amount paid is considered goodwill. 
Historically, financial statement reporting for a purchase of another firm books goodwill 
as an asset and the goodwill is amortized for up to 40 years. On the other hand, when 
firms merge through pooling accounting, no goodwill is created. The combined firms 
simply add previously recorded book values together. Thus, for financial statement 
reporting the purchase accounting results in higher booked assets and thus higher 
amortization expenses. This decreases the combined firms reported earnings and lowers 
earning per share; thus most mangers would seek to meet the criteria of pooling 
accounting. 
                                                                                                                                                 
51 Title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code; subtitle A; Chapter 1; Subchapter B; Part VI; section 197 effective 
August 1993 states that a taxpayer is entitled to an amortization deduction for goodwill over a period of up 
to 15 years. 
52 Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16 (August 1070) establishes 12 specific criteria that most be 
met in order to qualify for pooling accounting. These 12 criteria include the use of exchange of common 
stock (90% “substantially all” rule); no equity changes in contemplation of combination (two-year rule) and 
shares can be reacquired only for purposes other than business combination. If any criteria are not met, the 
purchase method must be used. 
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Financial statement reporting and tax code reporting can be different. For most of 
the US tax code history, amortization of goodwill was not a tax-deductible expense. Thus 
mangers were justifiably reluctant to inherit the appearance of lower earnings per share 
that resulted with purchase accounting. However, effective August 1993, section 127 of 
the US tax code regarding amortization of goodwill and other intangibles changed to 
allow taxpayers the amortization deduction. Although there have been recent changes 
regarding purchase versus pooling accounting, these changes do not affect the section 
127 tax code53. Since 1993 acquiring firms’ managers who chose purchase accounting 
received a tax benefit (reduction in taxes payable due to increase in amortizable 
deductions). Although the purchase method does have the appearance of lower earnings 
per share; in reality the purchase method through its real tax benefit affords higher cash 
flows to the purchasing firm. My sample of firms falls under this tax code. 
As an example, lets assume that a firm used purchase accounting with the 
acquisition of another firm. A very simple income statement might look like the 
following: 
 
                                                 
53 SFAS No. 141, Business Combinations, issued on 7-20-01 requires that the purchase method of 
accounting be used for all business combinations initiated after 6-30-01. This new purchase accounting 
method does not allow for goodwill amortization for financial reporting. Instead companies will recognize 
goodwill as an asset on financial statements and present it as a separate item on the balance sheet. 
Companies will then conduct an annual impairment test and goodwill will remain on the balance sheet as 
an asset subject to impairment. Some effects of this change may be that companies will no longer worry 
about structuring a deal in order to comply with pooling, goodwill will be more reflective of value and not 
a system of arbitrary amortization, and impairment charges could be costly and bumpy The new standards 
for goodwill accounting should contribute to more meaningful financial statements, improved transparency 
and greater consistency among companies. Three drawbacks are the lack of an international convergence, 
inconsistency with the existing tax code where goodwill remains amortizable, and the removal of the 
discipline of writing off goodwill which allows for more management discretion. 
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       Pooling    Purchase 
Operating Income  50    50 
Additional depreciation 
   Due to purchase   0    10 
Earnings before taxes  50    40 
Taxes at 40 percent  20    16 
Net Income   30    24 
Thus, net income and earnings per share are greater under pooling accounting. However, 
depreciation is a non-cash expense and as a matter of fact the sources of cash are greater 
with purchasing. Therefore, a more insightful manager might realize the tax savings of 
the purchase accounting will add value to the company’s cash flows. Additionally, this is 
what should matter to the investors. Thus, purchase accounting can be beneficial due to 
the tax advantage. Normally, purchase accounting is conducted with cash. However, if a 
firm believes its stock is undervalued and if the firm also has ample cash flow, managers 
may be able to avail themselves of the best of both worlds. They can first take advantage 
of their undervalued stock by announcing a repurchase and then use that stock to support 
an acquisition and by APBO No. 16 be forced to use purchase accounting which will save 
the firm future taxes. This scenario gives a strong argument for why firms would take on 
extra transactions in order to acquire another firm. They proceed with this method to take 
advantage of undervalued stock and to reduce the firm’s future tax burden.  
Most research on mergers and acquisitions finds that, on average, target firms 
gain value and the bidder firms lose value.54 For example, Travlos (1987) explores the 
                                                 
54 Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988, find average returns to bidders are non-positive. Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling, 1989, find that having a low Tobin’s Q (proxy for poor quality of bidding firm management) 
reduces the bidder’s return (see also Servaes, 1991). Dennis and McConnell, 1986, investigate firms’ senior 
securities and find that the bidder firm’s convertible preferred stockholders have significantly positive 
returns while all other security holders are not significantly different from zero. Jensen and Ruback, 1983, 
provide summary of the literature. 
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Method of Payment Hypothesis and finds that bidders who use stock have significant 
negative abnormal returns while bidders who make cash offers experience normal 
returns. Specifically, Travlos finds that bidders using stock have significant negative 
stock price return reaction of -0.78 percent on the day prior to the announcement and -
0.67 percent on the day of the announcement. Travlos concludes that, on average, 
stockholders of acquiring firms experience significant losses when their firm acquires 
another firm through the exchange of common stock. In contrast, bidders using cash 
offers have a positive two-day (-1,0) significant cumulative abnormal return reaction of 
0.24 percent. Travlos suggests that his findings are consistent with the Signaling 
Hypothesis. He explains that firms signal overvaluation if they finance a takeover with 
stock. Thus, managers will prefer cash if they believe their stock is undervalued, while a 
stock-financed offer will be preferred in the opposite case. Accordingly, the market 
participants respond favorably to cash offers and negatively to stock offers. If a firm 
announces that it will repurchase its own shares prior to or in conjunction with an 
acquisition announcement, then the market participants are not likely to perceive that the 
firm is overvalued. In fact the market should conclude quite the opposite. 
Taxes may have an important impact on stock price reactions of the bidding and 
target firms. Cash offers generate tax obligations for the target firm’s stockholders. 
Wansley, Lane and Yang (1987) suggest that bidding firms will pay a higher premium in 
a cash offer to compensate a target firm's shareholders for their tax burden of tendering 
shares. Thus, the target firm’s gain may simply be compensation for its upcoming tax 
burden. Again it should be noted that the firm using repurchased shares as the financing 
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vehicle would not have to offer the bidder firm additional compensation for the target’s 
tax consequences. However, it should be noted that the bidder’s shareholders may suffer 
a capital gains tax loss from tendering shares. 
A cash offer affects the taxes of the acquiring firms by raising the depreciation 
basis of acquired assets to the assets market values. This is advantageous to increasing 
the firm's expenses and decreasing the firm's tax liability, but also has the effect of 
reducing booked net income, which may have perceived adverse effects to the market 
participants. Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) investigate the gains to bidder firms and 
find significant positive stock price returns of 6.17 percent for an 81-day period 
surrounding a cash acquisition announcement and a zero gain for stock acquisitions. The 
authors suggest that the offer to the target reflects the bidder’s expectations of the target’s 
value. Alternatively, if the bidder believes that the target is overvalued the bidder will 
choose to finance with stock and if the bidders believes the target is undervalued the 
bidder will prefer cash55. 
Servaes (1991) and Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) also explore the takeover 
gains. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling document that abnormal returns in tender offers are 
related to Tobin's q (high q is defined as q>1 and low as q<1) and find that bidders with 
high q ratios have significant positive abnormal returns and low q bidders have 
significant negative returns. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling find the highest value is created 
when a high q firm takes over a low q firm and the value is destroyed when a low q firm 
takes over a high q firm. Servaes adds to the research of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling with 
                                                 
55 Hansen (1987) 
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the addition of merger offers in his extended sample of 704 successful takeovers over the 
period 1972-1987. Servaes finds for the total sample that target returns are positive 
(23.64 percent) and significant, bidder negative (-1.07 percent) and total returns positive 
(3.66 percent). Servaes splits his sample based on the method of payment and finds that a 
cash offer results in a 26.67 percent return to the target firm, 3.44 percent return to the 
bidder and an 8.41 percent to the combined firm (calculated as a weighted average). He 
finds that a stock-financed acquisition, on average, results in a 20.47 percent return to the 
target firm, a -5.86 percent to the bidder, and a -3.03 percent to the combined firm. 
Finally, a combined stock and cash offer results in a 21.05 percent return to the target, a -
3.74 percent return to the bidder, and 5.64 to the combined firm.   
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) investigate why returns to bidding firms are 
negative and find that returns are most negative when the firm acquires another firm as a 
diversification, when it acquires a growing firm, or if it has poor management. Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny suggest that managers make acquisitions to pursue personal 
objectives other than maximization of shareholder value. Thus, managers are willing to 
pay more for targets than they are worth if the acquisition will serve their personal 
benefits of improving their job security or diversifying their human capital. Loughran and 
Vijh (1997) calculate the total wealth gains for mergers and acquisitions and find that all 
returns to the bidder in a stock merger are negative (and cash is positive). Specifically, 
Loughran and Vijh find that stock acquirers earn 24.2 percent less than their matched 
firms, on average, using buy and hold returns over a five-year period; whereas cash 
acquirers earn 18.5 percent more than their matched firms. Loughran and Vijh suggest 
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that cash tender offers obtain considerable gains because of the associated disciplinary 
actions afforded to the cash acquisition, such as the ability to appoint new managers.  Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998) investigate long-term bidder performance and find that bidders in 
mergers underperform for up to three-years after the merger is complete.  
Rather than explaining the persistent negative and positive stock price reactions to 
acquisitions as a method of payment issue, Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2004) show 
that the primary determinant of long-term performance in strategic mergers is related to 
changes in corporate focus. The authors find that the change in focus is significantly 
related to performance after controlling for the form of payment56, and firm value ratios 
such as book-to-market ratio.57 The authors find that focus-decreasing mergers as defined 
by the Herfindahl index which quantifies the revenue changes of each line of business 
(SIC codes)58, result in significantly negative long-term performance.59 Furthermore 
Megginson, Morgan and Nail find that increasing or at least preserving the focus of the 
firm’s lines of business result in marginal long-term performance improvements. 
Megginson, Morgan and Nail’s regression results reveal that their measure of focus 
change is the only variable with significant relationships to long-term buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns. 
                                                 
56 Loughran and Vijh (1997), Ghosh (2001), Linn and Switzer (2001). and Martin (1996) 
57 Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Martin (1996) 
58 The degree of focus is found using the Herfindahl index for both revenue and assets. This looks at square 
of revenue (assets) of each division divided by the total revenue. Thus, the revenue of division A is divided 
by the revenue of the entire firm and then squared.  
59 Megginson etal find an average loss in stockholder wealth, firm value and cash flows of 18 percent, 9 
percent and 2 percent respectively for up to three years post-merger. 
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Sicherman and Pettway (1987) find that buyers of divested assets gain wealth if 
the firms have related assets as defined by their two digit SIC codes. The authors studied 
127 firms that acquired divested assets from 1893-1985 and found that related asset 
acquisitions resulted in an average 3.975 percent gain over firms that acquired unrelated 
divested assets. Sicherman and Pettway add that shareholders obtain higher returns when 
the acquirer purchases related lines of business. They further investigate how insider 
ownership affects the choice of relatedness.  
Copeland and Weston (1988) discuss that managers may be motivated to acquire 
unrelated assets in order to reduce personal risk. A substantial portion of the manager’s 
wealth is invested as human capital from employment. Thus, purchasing a divested 
unrelated line or simply diversifying the firm’s assets helps reduce the manager’s 
employment assets, which reduces personal risk. Sicherman and Pettway use insider 
ownership as a percentage of total ownership and find that firms acquiring related assets 
have a greater equity ownership than firms acquiring unrelated assets. Thus, firms that 
have high manager ownership are more likely to act in the shareholders’ best interests, 
whereas low ownership managers may be motivated to be more self-serving and prefer to 
reduce their own risk. 
Many studies note this effect. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that bidder 
results are slightly negative and the combined firm’s returns are positive. Thus, targets 
appear to be worth less than bidders pay, but are worth more than the target’s market 
value prior to the takeover, suggesting that the acquisition increases the combined 
shareholder wealth. Kaplan and Weisbach focus on 1971-1982 acquisitions that later 
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divested and classify some as successful. Although the emphasis of their paper is to show 
that not all firms that acquire another firm and then later divest are unsuccessful, they 
discovered an interesting outcome, showing that the market’s initial reaction to the 
acquisition did a good job predicting whether the later divestiture was a success or not. 
They define an unsuccessful acquisition as one that reports an accounting loss at the later 
date’s divestiture. Kaplan and Weisbach find that the combined returns at the acquisition 
announcement are significantly lower for the acquisitions that will, in hindsight, be 
classified as unsuccessful as compared to the corresponding returns for the successful 
divestitures and for the acquisitions that do not divest.  
Although it has been substantiated that bidders often lose in an acquisition, 
merger activity continues. Roll (1986) explains this acquisition fever in his hubris 
hypothesis. In summary, the hubris hypothesis suggests that managers are infected by 
hubris and so overpay for targets because they overestimate their own ability to run the 
merged firm.60 Furthermore, managers believe that they are better at estimating valuation 
than the merger evidence would indicate. Additionally, Jensen (1986) and others have 
noted that managers may want to increase the firm’s size because they value the status 
associated with a larger firm and furthermore their compensation may be tied to the size 
of the firm. Thus, managers do not want to reduce firm size by distributing assets to 
shareholders (see Roll (1986)). Managers are more concerned with growth in market 
share, in labor employment and in new lines of business than in maximizing shareholder 
wealth (see Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Thus, managers are more concerned with size 
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and things money cannot buy, such as perks, prestige and future employment, than they 
are with maximizing the value of the firm.61 
This desire to empire-build (see Roll (1986)) may lead to the acceptance of 
negative net present value projects; that is, managers may overinvest. Since managers are 
risk averse, they will not choose to increase their debt to the point of risking bankruptcy. 
Thus, rational self-serving managers will not want to increase interest payments and 
commitment levels in order to empire build; however, they will be more likely to make 
poor investment choices when free cash flow is available and bankruptcy is less likely. 
Poor investments could be carried out with cash or stock financing. If the firm chooses to 
use stock financing, managers may also conduct repurchasing activities to finance the 
stock-based acquisition. Thus, a repurchase in order to conduct an acquisition may signal 
an empire-building strategy and would not necessarily be good news to the market. 
Furthermore, stock-financed acquisitions have been shown to decrease the value of the 
acquiring firm.62 Thus, firms that repurchase to facilitate an acquisition may find that the 
market reactions to the repurchase announcements are similar to non-positive market 
reactions to acquisition announcements. 
Repurchasing stock in order to finance an acquisition creates one more step in the 
empire-building firm strategy. There are costs associated with this extra step (time lost 
and transaction fees) and therefore it would seem that there must be a benefit. It is likely 
                                                                                                                                                 
60 Shleifer and Vishny, 1988, suggest that managers willingly overpay for an acquisition to improve their 
job security. 
61 Graham and Harvey, 1999, survey 392 chief financial officers and find that executives are not concerned 
about many financial theories such as asset substitution, free cash flows or asymmetric information, but 
rather are concerned with earning per share dilution and recent stock price appreciation. 
62 Loughran and Vijh, 1997, and Travlos, 1987.  
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that both the signaling hypothesis and tax hypothesis play an important role in the 
financing plan. Firms that repurchase shares may signal undervaluation and firms that use 
stock to finance the acquisition in this situation must use purchase accounting. And 
although purchase accounting will reduce the book value of earnings per share, it also 
will reduce the firm’s taxes and thus increase its cash flows. 
 
Prediction, Data and Methodology 
 
Hypotheses 
 
In my previous chapter I suggest that an opportunistic reason for a repurchase is 
to fund an acquisition, and thus positive stock price reactions may not be anticipated. 
Based on previous research,63 if a repurchase is conducted in order to finance an 
acquisition it may also carry with it the poor stock return reactions that have been 
associated with bidder firms conducting acquisitions. However, researchers have made a 
clear distinction between cash-financed acquisitions and stock-financed acquisitions. If a 
firm uses cash to repurchase shares which are then used to acquire a target firm, this is 
not straight cash or straight stock-financed. Many researchers have documented losses to 
bidding firms that use stock. The use of repurchased shares to conduct an acquisition is 
stock-financed and may result in the negative abnormal returns associated with stock-
financed acquisitions. On the other hand, using repurchased stock to finance an 
acquisition is just adding a step to a cash-financed acquisition and thus may act according 
                                                 
63 Travlos, 1987; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Loughran and Vijh, 1987; and Rau and Vermaelen, 
1982. 
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to previous research and have no negative abnormal returns or possibly slightly positive 
returns.  
Additionally, using a repurchase to facilitate an acquisition begs further 
investigation. Why would a firm go through such transactional gymnastics? It would be 
simpler and less costly in time and dollars to just conduct an acquisition with cash.64 
Therefore, there must be some benefit to taking on this additional cost. It may be that the 
premium to acquire is less with a stock-financed acquisition than with a cash-financed 
acquisition for the bidding firm will not need to compensate the target firm for its 
immediate tax consequences. 65 
It is possible that the repurchase announcement gives managers the anticipated 
positive stock price return reaction which more than offsets the anticipated decrease in 
stock price with an acquisition announcement. In a sense, this may extinguish the 
negative return reactions associated with a straight stock offering and allow bidder 
managers to pay a smaller premium at the acquisition. If this is the case, I expect that 
these firms may have better long-term performance than firms that do not take the extra 
transactional step since they would be less likely to overpay for the acquisition. 66 
Finally, purchasing accounting does carry a long term tax advantage. Normally 
stock offered acquisitions do not use purchase accounting. However, if the firm uses 
                                                 
64 Loughran, Tim, and Anand M Vijh, 1997, Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit From Corporate 
Acquisitions?, Journal of Finance 52, 1765-1790. During a five-year period following the acquisition, on 
average, firms that complete stock mergers earn significantly negative excess returns of -25.0 percent 
whereas firms that complete cash tender offers earn significantly positive excess returns of 61.7 percent. 
65 Martin, 1996, finds that the higher the bidding firm’s investment opportunity set the more likely the firm 
will choose to use stock financing. 
66 Roll, Richard, 1986, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, The Journal of Business Vol. 59, 
pp. 197-216. Roll argues that firms on average pay too much for an acquisition and thus the poor post 
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repurchased shares it can only proceed with purchase accounting. This is an advantage to 
the long-term cash flows of the combined firms. 
In order to test, I will conduct a difference in means between firms announcing 
both a repurchase jointly with an acquisition and firms that announce an acquisition 
without a repurchase.  
Hypothesis 1 
 
Abnormal return (at the announcement date and long-term post announcement) 
will be less negative for firms that announce repurchase intentions with an 
acquisition announcement than for firms that only announce the acquisition.  
 
This test will be performed at the announcement date for announcement date 
effects and also three-year and four-year post announcement. 
Table 3-1 summarizes the hypotheses put forth in the literature. Most of the 
hypotheses make predictions on the method of payment choice. I question why firms 
would use cash to repurchase shares in order to conduct a stock-financed acquisition. 
Since the bidder firm wealth is not hurt by cash acquisitions and the combined firm 
wealth is, on average, better with cash, it is perplexing as to why a firm would incur 
additional transactions fees and most likely incur labor costs to take this extra financing 
step that at first glance does not appear to carry benefits. 
I review the hypothesis with this question in mind. My sample is of firms which 
either have the cash available at the repurchase announcement or did not make a credible 
repurchase announcement. If they have the cash available, then according to the cash 
availability hypothesis they will prefer to use it if they are undervalued. Since the firm 
                                                                                                                                                 
announcement returns should be expected. So, if firms are able to decrease the premium paid, their post 
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has chosen not to use the cash for the acquisition, but rather for the repurchase, the cash-
availability hypothesis suggests that the firm is overvalued. However, if the firm is 
overvalued it is not likely it would choose to repurchase its own stock (see Chapter 2). 
Thus, it is feasible that using cash directly to purchase another firm or using cash 
indirectly with repurchased share financing is inconsequential to the cash availability 
hypothesis in that both announcements are indicative of undervaluated bidder shares. 
The investment opportunity hypothesis predicts that a high-growth bidder will 
prefer stock because it will afford the high-growth firm with future financial flexibility. 
This hypothesis is not applicable to cash flush firms with moderate growth. The signaling 
hypothesis is a little problematic in that the repurchase signals undervaluation and the 
subsequent stock financing signals overvaluation. Although it is unlikely that a firm sets 
out to send mixed signals, it is possible that a firm prefers to use stock (ie. for risk sharing 
and future tax benefits) and plans to mitigate the bad news of overvaluation indicated 
with a stock financing by offsetting with the undervaluation signal of the repurchase 
announcement.  
The risk-sharing hypothesis is consistent with the extra financing. If a firm is 
concerned about the post-merger performance of the target firm then stock financing will 
mitigate this concern. Thus, if the target firm will represent a significant portion of the 
combined firm, it may be the preference of the bidder firm’s managers to share the risks, 
even if evidence of poor stock financed acquisitions is predominant. 
                                                                                                                                                 
returns may not be as poor. 
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The target firm managers may have a preference for stock financing in order to 
maintain some control in the merged firm.67 Thus, if the target is large enough in 
comparison to the bidder and the target firm’s managers have some control, they may be 
in the position to influence the financing decision. In the extreme, the target may be able 
to influence the bidder to first repurchase its shares and then to pass the shares on to the 
target firm’s shareholders. This argument may hold for the target manager shareholders; 
however, the argument fails for all the other target shareholders who should prefer cash 
due to the higher premium. It has also been suggested; however, that the higher premium 
is nothing more than compensation for the forced tax consequences and thus the high 
premium quickly disappears net of taxes. 
The control hypothesis states that if a manager desires to maintain his ownership 
position in the firm, he or she will prefer stock to finance an acquisition in order to 
maintain control. A repurchase decreases the total outstanding shares and thus serves to 
increase the ownership position of the non-tendering shareholders. Thus, managers with a 
high concern for their ownership position would favor repurchase of shares first to 
mitigate the loss in ownership position if a stock-financed acquisition was pursued over 
the preferable cash acquisition. 
Pooling accounting (stock financing) and repurchasing activities are both 
consistent with manager objectives of increasing earnings per share. Thus, if a manager’s 
compensation were tied to earnings per share, both repurchasing shares and stock 
financed acquisitions would supplement the manager’s compensation.  Thus, the pooling 
                                                 
67 Ghosh and Ruland, 1998. 
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versus purchasing hypothesis would be consistent with the doubled transactions. 
Furthermore, the doubled transactions may create favorable tax results.  Purchase 
accounting creates a tax burden on the target firm. Thus, stock financing is beneficial for 
both risk-sharing and tax consequences. Cash financing has historically better returns. 
Thus, it is possible that by taking on the extra transactions the firm is taking advantage of 
both types of financing and entering into a win-win situation.  
Finally, if it is not the method of payment that matters but only whether the 
acquisition is a good fit and increases the focus of the firm, then the transactions that 
preceded the acquisition may not be the important issue. This argument suggests that 
although it appears inefficient to use cash to repurchase shares to be used for the 
acquisition of another firm, this method of payment may not be predictive of poor post-
merger stock price returns that have been documented by numerous researchers. If the 
bidder acquires a firm that increases its focused line of business then value should be 
enhanced and the method of payment is immaterial. Similarly, if the bidder attempts a 
diversifying acquisition, the market would be expected to respond negatively.  
These studies suggest that a viable control for a value-enhancing merger versus a 
value-decreasing merger could be determined by whether the merger increases or 
maintains its focus or decreases its focus in diversification attempts. Flanagan and 
O'Shaughnessy (2003) use primary SIC codes to classify transactions core-related in their 
paper that explores which firm characteristics influence the size of acquisition 
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premiums.68 Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy classify an acquisition as core-related if both 
the acquiring and target firms share the same three or four digit SIC code. I will separate 
my firms that announce repurchase intentions to conduct an acquisition as value 
enhancing if the firms have the same three or four digit SIC code and are thus core-
related focus increasing or preserving firms. Firms will be considered focus decreasing if 
the acquiring and target firms do not share three or four digit SIC codes and appear un-
related. 
 
Sample 
 
The sample of firms announcing a repurchase in order to facilitate an acquisition 
are collected from Securities Data Corporation’s Mergers and Acquisitions database and 
Repurchases database. I begin by collecting all repurchase offers with an acquisition 
(ACQ) purpose. Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 
4910-4949) were removed because they are believed to face a different incentive 
structure around repurchase activity. Imposing these restrictions results in an initial 
sample of 103 firms with a repurchase announcement between 1995 and 2002. The 
sample is reduced to 96 firms with usable return information available from CRSP.  
Using the same database, I searched for acquisition announcement dates one year 
before and one year after the sample firms’ repurchase announcement and found that 
two-thirds (66) of the sample firms made both the repurchase and acquisition 
announcement on the same date. Of those 66 firms, nearly one-half (32) had announced 
                                                 
68 Flanagan and O’ Shaughnessy, 2001 explore the relationship between relatedness and takeover premiums 
and find that acquires that are not core-related to pay very high premiums when multiple bidders are 
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the acquisition at a previous date in addition to the second announcement made in 
conjunction with the repurchase announcement. Of the firms that did not make the 
acquisition announcement of the same date as the repurchase announcement, ten of them 
made the acquisition announcement prior to the repurchase announcement and eleven 
made the acquisition announcement after the repurchase announcement. Subsequent to 
the acquisition announcement, twelve firms withdrew their announcement. 
 
Methodology 
(See chapter 2, page 35.) 
Results 
 
Table 3-3 presents abnormal return data for my 96 firms that announce 
repurchase-financed acquisitions. The returns are relative to the repurchase 
announcement date with the exception of Panel C, which is at an acquisition 
announcement date and Panel G which is at the repurchase withdrawal date. Panel A 
shows the full sample of 96 firms. The CARs show the generally positive abnormal 
returns consistent with other researchers results.  
 Two-thirds of the sample firms announce the repurchase and the acquisition on 
the same date. The abnormal returns to this group shown in Panel B are similar, if not a 
little more significant then the entire sample of firms.  
 Panel C is very interesting in that one-third of the repurchased-financed firms had 
acquisition announcements prior to making the repurchasing announcements. Thus, at the 
                                                                                                                                                 
present. Although, the emphasis of the paper is not on the independent core-related variables, I plan to 
follow their procedure for defining core-relatedness by SIC codes. 
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time of the first acquisition announcement there would be little indication that the firms 
planned repurchase as part of the financing. Thus, ex ante the abnormal return reaction 
should be similar to all other acquisitions. Panel C, although only slightly significant, 
shows generally positive results, which is contrary to the prevailing documentation on 
acquisition returns. 
 Panel D is a very small group of only ten firms that made an acquisition 
announcement and later announced a repurchase. Panel D shows very little significance 
due to the small sample size. 
 Panel E is also a very small group. However, these eleven firms show some very 
significantly positive results. These firms made their repurchase announcement in 
advance of their acquisition announcement and have had exceptional market model value 
weighted CARs of 96.94 percent two-years post the repurchase announcement and 
159.64 percent three-years post. The beta of this group of firms is only .68 and thus the 
argument of being compensated for risk does not seem viable. 
 Twelve of my 96 firms later withdrew their repurchase intentions. The returns of 
these firms are displayed in Panel F. It appears that at the initial repurchase 
announcement these firms enjoy similar positive reactions accorded to repurchase 
announcing firms. Thus, there is no indication that the market expects the later 
withdrawal. However, in the long run these firms do not do as well as firms that carry out 
the repurchase plan. Panel G presents the same sub-sample of firms at the withdrawal 
date. 
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Table 3-4 directly tests hypothesis 1 and finds that prior to the acquisition 
announcement both the stock-financed and cash-financed firms show the characteristic 
negative abnormal returns. The repurchase group shows no abnormal returns and the 
groups are not different from each other. At the acquisition announcement event date all 
groups show moderate positive abnormal returns. The most interesting results begin to 
appear within 90 days of the acquisition announcement where the groups become very 
different from each other. The cash-financed (-1.8 percent) and stock-financed (-6.3 
percent) acquisitions show negative abnormal returns, whereas the repurchase-financed 
acquisition is slightly positive (1.3 percent). This distinction continues into the long-term 
with significantly negative abnormal returns for both the cash-financed (-33.4percent for 
two-year post) and stock-financed (-99.7 percent for two-year post) acquisitions and 
significantly positive for the repurchase-financed (11.8 percent for two-year post) returns. 
Thus, firms that take on the extra transactions seem to be well-compensated for their 
efforts. This table strongly supports my hypothesis. Not only do these repurchased-
financed acquisition firms not exhibit the characteristic negative abnormal returns of both 
cash-financed and stock-financed, these firms show positive CARs two-years, three-years 
and four-years post announcement. I attribute this to the firms reducing their tax burden 
by completing a purchase accounting acquisition. Straight cash-financed acquisitions also 
have this advantage; however, a cash-financed acquisition is not able to share the risk 
with the target shareholders in the merged firm. Furthermore, a straight cash-financed 
acquisition may have to pay a premium to target shareholders to compensate the target 
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shareholders with an increase in tax burden due to their most likely gain on the stock 
sale.69 
Table 3-6 is a multi-model table. The five panels A-E display the coefficients for 
pre-announcement, at the announcement and post-announcement time periods (30 day, 
two-year and three-year). Four multi-variate models are displayed in each panel. Each 
model uses a combination of control variables (market value three-year growth, three-
year sales growth, beta, earnings per share three-year growth, price to book ratio, and free 
cash flow) as well as the firms’ method of acquisition payment. These models show a 
dummy variable if the acquisition was financed with a repurchase or another dummy 
variable if the acquisition was financed with 100 percent cash. The base case is if the 
acquisition is 100-percent stock financed, and thus the parameter is zero and is not 
shown.  
Panel A shows the cumulative abnormal returns prior to the acquisition 
announcement. There appears to be no difference in the abnormal return performance of 
the sample of firms based on their method of financing their acquisitions prior to the 
announcement. 
Panel B displays the event-date announcement CARs. At the announcement three 
of the models show significant positive coefficients for both cash-financed acquisitions in 
comparison to the base case of the stock-financed acquisition, and one model shows 
significant positive coefficients for the repurchased-financed acquisitions. Panel C 
                                                 
69 As an aside it may be that some firms with available cash do not take advantage of this double 
transactional step due to the advantage of cash-financed acquisitions being quick, allowing firms to avoid 
undue competition. 
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displays the short-term stock price reactions from two-days to 30-days post 
announcement. This time period’s results are very similar to the announcement-event 
period return. However, the size-control variable; market value growth for the last three 
years, and the risk control variable; beta, both show negative coefficients. As shown in 
the first two panels, panel C also displays a very small R-square. 
Panels D and E show very interesting results and also much higher R –squares 
(ranging between 26 and 41 percent) for the two-years and three-years post 
announcement, respectively. During these time periods, we find that the coefficients for 
the cash-financed acquisition are mixed and not significant in comparison to the stock-
financed acquisition. However, in the long-term the repurchase acquisition group’s 
coefficients become strongly significantly positive. Consistent with table 3- 4, it appears 
that firms that finance acquisitions with repurchased shares do very well in the long term. 
Similarly to chapter 2, ExecuComp data was obtained for the three types of 
distinct acquisition financing groups. Data on 175 firms using only cash financing, 100 
firms using only stock financing and only three firms using repurchases financing were 
found. Due to the extremely small sample size of the repurchasing acquisition firms, no 
further testing was attempted to differentiate the officers’ stock ownership or options. 
There was, however, information that could be obtained through the compustat 
database to differentiate the firm choice of acquisition financing. The mean market value 
of the firms, the return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), net income, and free 
cash flows for all three groups of firms is shown in table 3-5. Firms choosing to 
repurchase shares to finance an acquisition are larger, have higher returns on assets and 
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returns on equity and have significantly higher free cash flows. Furthermore, all firms 
that conduct repurchases financing have positive net incomes during the year of the 
acquisition whereas; only 80 percent of the cash-financed firms and 73 percent of the 
stock-financed firms can make the same claim. 
Conclusion 
Firms that take on the extra transactional step of repurchasing shares to finance an 
acquisition are well compensated for their efforts, especially in the long run. These firms 
have cash available and positive earnings but on average have negative abnormal returns 
prior to their repurchase announcements. Thus, these firms are likely to be undervalued 
and therefore choose this method of financing to signal undervaluation in the market 
place. These firms experience risk sharing with the target firms, counteract the negative 
effects of dilution by repurchasing shares first, and enjoy a tax advantage for their efforts. 
 My results raise the question as to why more firms do not take advantage of this 
win-win situation. Aboddy, Kasnik and Williams (2000) argued that managers should 
prefer pooling accounting because all else equal, purchase accounting hurts net income 
and earning per share for years to come. I suggest that since management compensation 
is likely tied to these performance measures, most managers do prefer pooling 
accounting. However, this is shortsighted. 
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Table 3-2 Variable Definitions 
Beta = CRSP beta. 
 
Cash 100% = Bidding firm acquired target firm with 100 percent cash financing. 
 
EPS growth = EPSgrow = the three-year least squares annual growth rate of Net Income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations less preferred dividend 
requirements (ExecuComp EPSEX3LS). 
 
Free CF = The free cash flow concept is Operating Activities - Net Cash Flow minus 
Cash Dividends minus Capital Expenditures (Compustat OANCF-DV-CAPX). 
 
Market Value = This data item provides a pre-calculated company-level market value 
based upon the sum of all the company’s trading issues multiplied by their respective 
closing price (Compustat PRCC * CSHO) and is reported in millions of dollars. 
 
Market Value3 = The 3-year least squares annual growth rate in market value 
(ExecuComp MKTVAL3LS). 
 
NI = The income or loss reported in millions of dollars by a company after expenses and 
losses have been subtracted from all revenues and gains for the fiscal period including 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (Compustat annual data item A172). 
 
Price to book = The market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the 
market value of assets is the book value of assets plus the market value of equity 
(Compustat item #24 times Compustat item #25) minus the book value of equity. 
 
ROA = Return on Assets is Income Before Extraordinary Items - Available for Common, 
divided by Total Assets, which is defined as the sum of current assets, net property, plant, 
and equipment, and other non-current assets. This is then multiplied by 100 (Compustat 
IBCOM/AT)*100. 
 
Repurchase = Bidding firm acquired target firm with repurchased shares. 
 
ROE = Return on Equity is Income Before Extraordinary Items - Available for Common, 
defined as income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations less preferred 
dividend requirements, but before adding savings due to common stock equivalents, 
divided by Common Equity - Total, which is defined as the common shareholders' 
interest in the company. The result is multiplied by 100 (Compustat IBCOM/CEQ)*100). 
 
Sales3 = The 3-year least squares annual growth rate in sales (ExecuComp SALES3LS). 
 
Stock 100% = Bidding firm acquired target firm with 100 percent stock financing. 
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Table 3-3  Repurchase to Fund an Acquisition 
Cumulative Abnormal Market Model Returns (CARs) for both equal 
and value weighted portfolios of firms announcing a repurchase from 
1995-2002 for the purpose of conducting an acquisition.  
Panel A: All Firms Announcing Repurchase Plans to Fund an 
Acquisition. (n = 96, mean beta = 0.75). Abnormal returns are relative 
to the repurchase announcement date. 
Window Market Model   Scholes-Williams   
  Equal Wt   Value Wt   Equal Wt   Value Wt   
-30-2 -2.84%  -2.67%  -1.14%  -3.64%  
-1,+1 1.57% ** 1.68% *** 1.67% ** 1.56% ** 
+2,+30 0.91%  1.97%  1.05%  1.27%  
+31,+504 29.42% *** 30.47% *** 49.41% *** 17.94% ***
+31,+756 41.49% *** 45.92% *** 72.15% *** 26.75% ***
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01 
Panel B: This panel is a sub-sample of panel A. This sub-sample 
includes the firms making both announcements on the same date. (n = 
66, mean beta = 0.92) 
Window Market Model   Scholes-Williams   
  Equal Wt   Value Wt   Equal Wt   Value Wt   
-30-2 -1.05%  -0.39%  -1.42%  -0.80%  
-1,+1 2.31% *** 2.36% *** 2.29% *** 2.25% ***
+2,+30 2.40%  3.22%  2.02%  2.73%  
+31,+504 34.20% ** 34.78% ** 32.22% *** 30.82% ** 
+31,+756 46.11% ** 50.36% *** 42.37% *** 44.05% ***
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01 
Panel C: This panel is a sub-sample of panel B. The repurchase and the 
acquisition were announced on the same date, however the acquisition 
also had an earlier announcement. (n = 32, mean beta = 0.90) 
Window Market Model   Scholes-Williams   
  Equal Wt   Value Wt   Equal Wt   Value Wt   
-30-2 3.98%  4.65% * 3.64%  3.82%  
-1,+1 1.27% * 1.28% * 1.18% * 1.43% * 
+2,+30 1.40%  0.16%  0.64%  0.27%  
+31,+504 15.11% * 16.68% * 13.18% * 13.93%  
+31,+756 30.72% ** 32.77% ** 28.93% ** 29.81%  
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01 
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Table 3-3  Repurchase to Fund an Acquisition (continued) 
Panel D: This is a sub-sample of firms that only announced their 
acquisition intentions in advance of their repurchase announcement. The 
returns are shown relative to the repurchase announcement. (n=10, 
mean beta = 0.76) 
Window Market Model   Scholes-Williams   
  Equal Wt   Value Wt   Equal Wt   Value Wt   
-30-2 -6.16%  -3.01%  -4.52%  -2.82%  
-1,+1 0.83%  1.42%  0.89%  1.35%  
+2,+30 -4.59%  -1.12%  -4.47%  -1.46%  
+31,+504 -1.39%  15.07%  1.95%  16.96%  
+31,+756 1.17%  24.83%  6.42%  29.59%  
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01 
Panel E: This sub-sample of firms made acquisition announcements and 
a subsequent repurchase announcement. The returns are shown relative 
to the repurchase announcement. (n=11, mean beta 0.68) 
Window Market Model   Scholes-Williams   
  Equal Wt   Value Wt   Equal Wt   Value Wt   
-30-2 -1.50%  -1.86%  -2.05%  -2.66%  
-1,+1 2.88%  3.08%  2.89%  2.97%  
+2,+30 11.86%  10.17%  12.29% * 11.01%  
+31,+504 93.94% *** 96.94% *** 91.29% *** 98.81% ***
+31,+756 158.45% *** 159.64% *** 151.81% *** 163.23% ***
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01 
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Table 3-3  Repurchase to Fund an Acquisition (continued) 
Panel F: A small sub-sample of firms announced repurchases and later 
withdrew. This is at the repurchase announcement date. (n=12, beta = 
1.18) 
Window Market Model  Scholes-Williams  
  Equal Wt   Value Wt  Equal Wt   Value Wt  
-30-2 2.18%  1.69%  2.93%  1.42%  
-1,+1 2.00% ** 1.62% * 2.04% ** 1.64% *
+2,+30 1.39%  0.24%  1.00%  0.11%  
+31,+504 -18.90%  -19.49%  -17.79%  -21.54%  
+31,+756 -22.62%  -32.44%  -20.08%  -34.58%  
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01 
Panel G: A small sub-sample of firms announced repurchases and later 
withdrew. This is at the withdrawal date. (n=12, beta = 0.92) 
Window Market Model  Scholes-Williams  
  Equal Wt   Value Wt  Equal Wt   Value Wt  
-30-2 0.46%  -0.88%  0.92%  -0.44%  
-1,+1 -1.37% * -1.30% * -1.34% * -1.22% *
+2,+30 0.69%  1.95%  0.70%  1.66%  
+31,+504 6.75%  8.86%  3.07%  8.95%  
+31,+756 5.32%  5.10%  3.26%  5.71%  
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01 
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3-4    Comparison of Acquisition with and without a Repurchase 
CARs using the market model are shown for firms announcing an acquisition from 1995 
– 2002. The firms are separated into firms that also announced a plan to repurchase stock 
in conjunction with the acquisition announcement (Repurchase) and firms that financed 
the acquisition with 100 percent cash (Cash) and firms that financed the acquisition with 
100 percent stock (Stock). ANOVA differences follow for the group differences of the 
abnormal returns for the seven event time periods: 30 days to two days prior to the 
acquisition announcement (-30, -2), the event period (-1, +1), 30 days post-
announcement (+2, +30), 90 days post-announcement (+31, +90), one-year, two-years, 
and three-years post-announcement (+31, +252), (+31, +504), (+31, +756), respectively. 
  Repurchase   Cash 100%   Stock 100%   P-value 
Beta 0.98  1.12  1.24   
n  436  9205  4497   
(-30,-2) 0.000  -0.005 *** -0.006  0.960 
(-1,+1) 0.005 * 0.011 *** 0.009  0.449 
(+2,+30) 0.013 * -0.018 *** -0.063 *** 0.000 
(+31,+90) -0.018 *** -0.041 *** -0.102 *** 0.000 
(+31,+252) 0.009  -0.158 *** -0.441 *** 0.000 
(+31,+504) 0.118 *** -0.334 *** -0.997 *** 0.001 
(+31,+756) 0.199 *** -0.417 *** -1.355 *** 0.199 
 
 
 
Table 3-5    Acquiring Firm Characteristics  
Data is obtained from Compustat for market value, return on assets, return on equity, net 
income and free cash flows for firms choosing to acquire firms by financing with 
repurchases, cash, and stock. Mean values are shown. 
  Market Value ROA ROE NI Free Cash Flow 
Repurchase 14,327 3.6 15.2 1,122 1,962 
Cash 100% 9,425 1.3 1.2 261 164 
Stock 100% 6,955 -175.2 -5.3 145 48 
p-value 0.004 0.277 0.353 0.000 0.000 
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Table 3 - 6 Market Reaction to Type of Financed Acquisition 
Announcement 
The acquisitions are financed by a repurchase, 100 percent stock or 100 
percent cash. Shown are the dummy variables if the acquisition was 
financed with a repurchase and financed with cash, otherwise stock. (t-
statistics in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significant levels at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels). Models include firms announcing acquisitions 
from 1995 to 2002. Returnit = b0 + b1Xit + b2year Indicators + eit 
A. Return for (-30, -2)        
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)   
Intercept 0.01705  0.02048  -0.02080  0.00551  
 (0.84)  (1.03)  (-3.52)  (0.76)  
Dummy if cash -0.00939  -0.01214  0.02319 *** -0.01197  
 (-.0.60)  (-0.78)  (4.52)  (-1.58)  
Dummy if rep. -0.06016  -0.06254  0.01239  -0.00790  
 (-1.00)  (-1.05)  (1.14)  (-0.42)  
Mkt Val 3 year 0.00015  0.00014  0.00004  -0.00008  
 (0.97)  (0.91)  (1.37)  (-1.50)  
Sales 3 year -0.00019  -0.00017  -0.00007  0.00006  
 (-0.66)  (-0.61)  (-0.97)  (0.94)  
Beta  -0.02375 ** -0.02517 ** 0.00081    
 (-2.01)  (-2.17)  (0.30)    
EPS  3 year -0.00020  -0.00020 *     
 (-1.63)  (-1.65)      
Price/Book 0.00023  0.00012      
 (0.37)  (0.19)      
Free cash flow 0.00000        
 (-0.25)        
R-square 0.0121  0.0126  0.0178  0.0017  
n 782  793  1235   2664   
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Appendix A: T-Test 
 
The time series standard deviation method (t-test) calculates a single variance 
estimate for the entire portfolio. Its drawback is that it does not take into consideration 
unequal return variance across securities. However, on the other hand, it does avoid 
potential problems of cross-sectional correlation of security returns. The estimated 
variance of AARt is    
    Σ (AA Rt –AARmean)2 
   σ =             D-2 
where D = estimation period and 
    Σ AA Rt 
     AARmean =       D 
 
and the portfolio test statistic for day t is 
 
    AA Rt 
       t =      σAAR 
 
and the test statistic for CAART1T2, assuming time-series independence is  
 
       CAA Rt______                              
       t =   (T2-T1+1)1/2 σAAR 
 
In order to calculate the z test statistic, it is assumed under the null hypothesis that Ajt has 
mean zero and variance σ2Ajt. The maximum likelihood estimate of the variance is 
 
   1         (Rmt-Rmmean)2 
S2Ajt = S2Aj 1 + Dj +   Σ (Rmt-Rmmean)2 
 
where    S2Ajt =  Σ A2jk / (Dj – 2)   
    
Rmt is the observed return on the market index on day t, Rmmean is the mean market 
return over the estimation period and Dj is the number of non-missing trading day returns 
in the D-day interval. The standardized abnormal return is defined as  
 
   SARjt = Ajt/SAjt 
 
Under the null, each SARjt follows a student’s t distribution with Dj-2 degrees of 
freedom. Summing SARjt across the sample 
 
   TSARt = Σ SARjt 
 
and the expected variance of TSARt is  
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   Qt = Σ (Dj – 2) / (Dj – 4) 
 
and the test statistic for the null hypothesis that CARRT1T2 = 0 is 
 
   ZT1,T2 = 1 / N1/2 Σ Z T1T2, 
where   
   ZT1,T2 = 1/ Q T1,T2 1/2 Σ SARjt 
 
and   QT1T2 = (T2 – T1 + 1) (Dj – 2) / (Dj – 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
About the Author 
 Robin Wilber received a Bachelor’s Degree in Civil Engineering from the 
University of Florida in 1980 and a M.B.A. from the University of South Florida in 1986. 
She worked as an engineer and a corporate controller until she entered the Ph.D. program 
in Finance at the University of South Florida. 
 Ms. Wilber began teaching many finance courses as a Ph.D. student and also 
served one year as an instructor at the University of South Florida at St. Petersburg. Ms. 
Wilber is currently an Assistant Professor of Finance at Niagara University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
